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Letter from the Chair  
 
This is my first letter as the new Chair of the 
MSB Studies Group as I take over the leadership 
from Eric Thompson, who served a three-year 
term characterized by hard work and a devotion 
to increase the visibility and maintain the 
credibility of our organization. He remains as 
Chair ex-officio and will continue keep MSB on 
strong footing as we seek to build and grow our 
group to include members from around the 
world who work on and think about this key 
region of insular Southeast Asia. 
 
At our annual meeting, which always takes place 
at the Association of Asian Studies conference, 
we thanked Eric for his wonderful service, and 
voted to elect Cheong Gan Soon as the Deputy 
Chair and Chair-Elect. We were delighted that 
Dominik Müller agreed to take over the 
editorship of BERITA, and this issue reflects his 
effort to producing the Summer 2018 issue right 
on schedule. Dominik, Cheong Soon, and I are 
committed to making BERITA a publication 
that truly matters to our members and serves 
their interests. Along with our Google Group, 
“msbforum,” (which you can join by emailing me 
at msbchair@gmail.com); our very active and 
informative Facebook group (which you can 
request to join at “Official Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei Studies Group [MSB]”); and our annual 
meeting, we communicate with and across a very 
wide and growing group of people who share our 
interests. But BERITA, (formerly and for 
decades appearing in print form) has always been 
the mainstay and foundation of our efforts. 
 
If you look at the BERITA summer 1998 issue, 
published exactly twenty years ago (you can find 
twenty years of BERITA linked to our Facebook 
page and the earlier issues online at the Ohio 
State Library), you’ll learn what mattered to 
readers then. It has an interview with 
anthropologist Ronald Provencher, who served 
as Chair of MSB for many years and an editor of 
BERITA. A list of new books published appears:  
among them several worth another look in the 
current moment—Francis Loh Kok and Khoo 
Boo Teik’s Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and 
Practices, Edmund Terence Gomez’s Chinese 
Business in Malaysia, and Peter Searles’ The 
Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-Seekers or 
Real Capitalists? Articles discuss Vincent Tan’s 
lawsuit against Jomo K.S. (claiming defamation 
from Jomo’s op-ed in the Asian Wall Street 
Journal—“Malaysia Props Up Crony 
Capitalists”)—and the dismissal of Chandra 
Muzaffar from Universiti Malaya. Those were 
turbulent and interesting times in Malaysia; they 
remain so, and we want BERITA to be a place 
where you learn much about them. We urge all 
of our members and readers to consider 
submitting material to the next issue of BERITA 
and any that follow. Please send us articles on 
your research, publications, and calls for papers 
and conferences, and use BERITA as a place to 
highlight your work and writing. We would 
especially like to spotlight the work of young 
scholars, report on recently published works, 
provide short reports about MSB-related events, 
and publish interviews with people in our field. I 
hope you enjoy this current issue. 
 
Patricia Sloane-White, MSB Group Chair 
Department of Women and Gender Studies 
University of Delaware, USA 
pswhite@udel.edu 
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Announcements 
 
Application for MSB Panel Sponsorship: 
The Malaysia-Singapore-Brunei Studies Group 
sponsors one panel per year at the annual 
conference of the Association for Asian Studies. 
Members interested in panel sponsorship by the 
MSB are asked to submit the full panel and paper 
abstracts to the MSB Chair (pswhite@udel.edu) 
at least one week before the AAS Submission 
deadline, which is August 1, 2018 for the March 
21-24, 2019 conference in Denver, Colorado.  
Sponsorship indicates a level of pre-vetting and 
assurance of the session’s quality and importance 
by the sponsoring group or institution, which is 
taken into consideration by the AAS Program 
Committee during the review process. eration by 
the AAS Program Committee during the review 
process. Please note, sponsored sessions are not 
guaranteed acceptance and must undergo 
normal competitive review. The listing of a 
sponsor for the submitted proposal is taken into 
consideration by the Program Committee during 
the review process, but is not a guarantee of 
acceptance. If you would like your panel to be 
sponsored by the MSB Study Group, please 
mark the box on the proposal form indicating 
sponsorship—i.e., as if your MSB sponsorship 
were already confirmed. We will review all 
submissions and determine if sponsorship is to 
be granted. 
 
 
Prizes 
 
John A. Lent Prize 2018 
 
Prof. John A. Lent founded BERITA in 1975, 
editing it for twenty-six years, and founded the 
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group in 
1976, serving as chair for eight years. He has been a 
university faculty member since 1960, in Malaysia, 
the Philippines, China, and various U.S. universities. 
From 1972-74, Prof. Lent was founding director of 
Malaysia's first university-level mass communi-
cations program at Universiti Sains Malaysia. He 
has been a professor at Temple University since 1974. 
 
Over the years, Prof. Lent has written monographs 
and many articles on Malaysian mass media, 
animation, and cartooning. He is the author and 
editor of seventy-one books and monographs, and 
hundreds of articles and book chapters. Since 1994, he 
has chaired the Asian Cinema Society and has been 
the editor of the journal Asian Cinema. He publishes 
and edits the International Journal of Comic Art, 
which he started in 1999, and is chair of the Asian 
Research Center on Animation and Comic Art and 
Asian-Pacific Association of Comic Art, both of 
which he established. 
 
John A. Lent Prize Commendation 
The 2018 John A. Lent prize is awarded to the 
best paper with Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei 
content presented at the previous year’s (2017) 
Association for Asian Studies conference. After 
careful consideration of the papers submitted for 
the prize, the Committee for the John A. Lent 
Prize for the best paper on Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Brunei presented to the AAS in the previous 
year has chosen as its winner Dominik M. 
Müller, for his paper “The Bureaucratization of 
Islam and its Socio-Legal Dimensions in 
Southeast Asia: Ethnographic Observations 
from Brunei Darussalam and their Implications 
for Conceptualizing a Larger Comparative 
Framework.” The three committee members all 
agreed that Müller’s paper deserves special 
recognition for its compelling and original focus 
and the high quality of its analysis. 
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All of the submitted papers this year were 
meticulously crafted, with strong theoretical 
bases. But Müller, in particular, has brought 
many theoretical lenses to play, which lends the 
reader multiple entry points into his analysis. He 
argues, convincingly, that the bureaucratization 
of Islam “is not simply synonymous” with its 
“institutionalization, but …constitutes a wider 
socio-legal phenomenon that far transcends its 
institutional boundaries” as it “deeply 
penetrate(s) into public discourse and everyday 
life.” Choosing Brunei—a woefully understudied 
region in our organization and beyond—and 
offering a detailed understanding of the 
mechanics and structure of its Islamic state is in 
itself of great value, but Müller makes it clear 
that Brunei is a key site and “ideal type” for 
studying and conceptualizing the bureaucra-
tization of religion. It is, however, his ambitious 
proposal for a broad intraregional, transnational, 
and collaborative research project on the 
bureaucratization of religion that is the highlight 
of his paper, and he has more than adequately 
made the case not just for filling a gap in the 
literature, but the worth of the analysis. What is 
equally tantalizing is his aim to create an 
epistemic partnership with his subjects—a 
crucial and overdue turn in the anthropology of 
power and bureaucracy. Müller’s own data on 
Brunei is intriguing, though by no means yet 
complete, and he recognizes that so much more 
work needs to be done for the ambitious 
theoretical framework to be sustainable. Finally, 
Müller’s paper shows strong awareness for the 
impact circulations of power bring to bear on 
ethnographic studies and builds an excellent case 
for conceptualizing bureaucratization of Islamic 
religious authority not only in the Brunei, 
Malaysia, and Singapore region but anywhere 
governments and institutions produce and 
exercise “the micro-politics of bureaucratic 
meaning-making and knowledge production.” 
 
The Committee for the John A. Lent Prize 
congratulates Dominik Müller for this 
outstanding and compelling contribution to our 
knowledge. 
 
Prize Committee Members: Eric C. 
Thompson, Cheong Soon Gan, and Jamie 
Davidson. 
 
 
Ronald Provencher Travel Grant  
 
The Ronald Provencher Travel Grant is named in 
honor of Ronald Provencher, distinguished cultural 
anthropologist of Malaysia, a long-time leader of the 
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group and 
former editor of BERITA. It carries with it a 
US$750 award for a graduate student, postdoctoral 
fellow, or independent scholar from Malaysia, 
Singapore or Brunei to travel to present a paper at the 
Association for Asian Studies meeting.  
 
The 2018 Ronald Provencher Travel Grant was 
awarded to Helena Binti Muhamad Varkkey, 
Senior Lecturer, Department of International 
and Strategic Studies, University of Malaya. 
Throughout her academic career, she has been 
working on themes related to sustainable 
development. Her interest in the field has 
evolved to a focus on transboundary pollution in 
Southeast Asia, particularly pertaining to the 
role of patronage in agribusiness, especially the 
palm oil industry and its links to forest fires and 
haze in the region. At the 2018 AAS Conference, 
Helena Varkkey presented a paper entitled 
“Transboundary Haze as a Human Health Issue 
in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and Member State 
Responses,” at a panel sponsored by the AAS 
Berita	 5 
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Southeast Asia Council (SEAC) and TRaNS 
Journal, entitled “Airs, Waters, Places and the 
Peoples Who Use and Abuse All of Them in 
Southeast Asia.” 
 
Abstract: 
“Haze has been a serious transboundary problem 
in Southeast Asia for decades. Originating 
largely from fires in Indonesia, the smoke travels 
across borders affecting up to six Southeast 
Asian states almost annually. Haze contains fine 
particles which irritate the eyes and penetrate 
the lungs. As a result, scores of Indonesians, 
Malaysians, and Singaporeans suffer from 
respiratory, dermatological, and ophthal-
mological problems. These health risks, together 
with reduced visibility, have also caused tourist 
numbers to drop dramatically. This chapter 
observes that governments worked hard to 
protect and maintain their tourism sectors in the 
face of the haze. The main tactic used was 
to underrepresent the health risks of haze, both 
to citizens and tourists. As a result, regional 
governments largely failed to recognize the haze 
as a serious public health issue. At the national 
level, states often under-report health effects in 
the attempt to keep tourism levels stable. At the 
regional level, member states have yet to agree 
on a common ASEAN-wide regional air quality 
measurement system, with many continuing to 
use a system that tends to underrepresent health 
risks. At the international level, affected states 
have been quick to debunk research that 
indicates higher levels of mortality. As a result, 
citizens lacked the awareness and urgency to 
make wise health and well-being decisions 
during haze episodes. Sustainable development 
involves economic growth balanced with social 
development and environmental sustainability. 
However, the case of the haze shows that 
Southeast Asian states still find it challenging to 
balance these elements in the spirit of sustainable 
development.” 
 
The full article will be published in an edited 
volume, Sustainable Development; Asia-Pacific 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, ed. 
Pak Sum Low, forthcoming 2018/9).  
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Panel Report 
 
MSB Sponsored Panel 
 
Food, Belonging and Identity in Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Malaysia/Singapore – A Panel 
Report 
 
Patricia Sloane-White  
 
This panel received the official sponsorship of 
the Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group, 
at the Association of Asian Studies, Annual 
Conference, Saturday, March 25, Washington, 
DC. 
 
Chair and discussant: Patricia Sloane-White, 
University of Delaware. 
 
Presenters: 
Cheong Soon Gan, University of Wisconsin-
Superior 
Chee-Kien Lai, Singapore University of 
Technology and Design, Singapore  
Mareike Pampus, Max Planck Institute for 
Social Anthropology 
 
The panel examined the constant creation and 
re-creation of Malayan, Malaysian, and 
Singaporean identities against the backdrop of 
ever-fluid regional and global encounters 
through the lens of food culture. The 
methodologically-varied papers had roots in 
history, architecture, and anthropology, spanned 
the late-19th century to the present, and explored 
how various communities negotiated personal 
and group identities as well as questions of 
belonging as they transitioned from visitors, 
migrants and sojourners to residents and 
citizens. They addressed how, from Furnivall’s 
plural society to national communities, food 
became the nexus in which identity was created, 
defined, expressed, re-created, re-defined, gazed 
upon and discursively controlled in Malaya, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. 
 
Cheong Soon Gan’s (University of Wisconsin-
Superior) “Food, Cultural Identity, and the 
Western Gaze in late 19th-century Malaya,” 
explored the Western gaze on various Malayan 
communities’ food culture in the middle to late 
19th century as Malaya was evolving into a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with a 
mixed economy of global cash crops and 
traditional occupations. The contact between 
various Malayan communities, initially 
conceptualized as limited in J.S. Furnivall’s 
plural society, but increasingly re-examined in 
newer scholarship (such as Su Lin Lewis’ study 
on urban cosmopolitanism, Cities in motion), 
occurred mainly within the realm of the 
unrecorded, everyday lived experiences, unless 
captured by the Western gaze. Reflecting on the 
writings of Isabella Bird, Emily Innes and 
Harriette McDougall published in the 1880s, 
Gan demonstrated how the intersection of food 
and identity was expressed, understood and 
conceptualized by both the participants and 
observers. Their observations on the consump-
tion of food, the preparation of meals, the social 
and cultural context of eating and drinking, and 
the various communities’ relationship with their 
environment reveal a lively food culture that was 
the vanguard in cracking the plural society 
barriers among Malayan communities, forcing 
them to confront questions of identity while co-
existing in a rapidly changing cultural, social, 
and economic milieu.  
 
Chee-Kien Lai (Singapore University of 
Technology and Design, Singapore) delivered 
Berita	 7 
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“Tropical Fruits and Overseas Chinese Identity 
in Singapore,” and reflected on research on the 
“exotic” fruits (such as the mango, jackfruit, 
mangosteen, papaya, Chinese fig, coconut, 
pineapple, duku, langsat, breadfruit, soursop, 
durian, and rambutan) discussed by overseas 
Chinese contributors to the Journal of the South 
Seas Society, published from the 1940s in 
Singapore. The heightened awareness of such 
fruits also permeated into the quotidian life of the 
overseas Chinese. The paper described the 
important role of fruits in transferring overseas 
Chinese identity from that of sojourner to 
potential resident. The ingestion of local fruits 
not only helped in adapting these migrants to 
their haptic consumption of local food, but also, 
the availability of these fruits only seasonally 
throughout the year assisted in their 
synchronizing or calibrating of tropical time to 
their own existential time. Lai demonstrated 
how the fruits themselves became assimilated 
forms of imagining and understanding of 
traditions, identities, and community in the 
“overseas Chinese” in Southeast Asia. 
 
Mareike Pampus (Max Planck Institute for 
Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany) delivered 
“Chicken Kapitan: The Manifestation of 
Connectivity in Nyonya Cooking,” an 
anthropological exploration of how one Nyonya 
dish, Chicken Kapitan, demonstrates how the 
movements of tastes, ingredients and eating 
habits play a significant role, particularly in 
highly diverse places like port cities. Using the 
notion of “connectivity”—the merging of local 
and global influences and the movement of 
people, goods, and techniques—Pampus showed 
how socio-cultural adaptation took place among 
the Nyonya cooks of Penang to demonstrate that 
identities were shaped through and with food. 
Penang Nyonya cooking emerged as something 
original and highly localized, neither a product 
of a homeland or a nation state, but one that was 
unique to this port city, its colonial past and its 
culturally mixed groups. 
 
In her comment, Patricia Sloane-White 
(University of Delaware) noted that the three 
papers asked the audience to see globalization 
not as merely a destructive force, but as a long 
historical and cultural movement of people and 
things that produced innovative, novel, and 
hybrid forms of identity. The authors pointed to 
how food, fruit, and cooking provide us with a 
way to move beyond merely theorizing about 
global connections to actually clarifying, in 
specific moments and places, precisely how those 
interactions occurred in empire, diasporas, and 
port cities, producing, in effect, literally “recipes” 
for hybridity. Cheong Soon Gan’s paper 
provided a view into the wet markets and the 
kitchens of colonial interactions as they became 
“trans-cultural” and “incorporative.” Chee Kien 
Lai’s paper provided not just a theory of 
hybridization but insight into the actual 
hybridization of culture through botanical 
expertise as the overseas Chinese experimented 
with growing fruits that reminded them of home. 
And Mareike Pampus’ paper figuratively entered 
the cooking pot—and the Penang melting pot—
where cultural symbols and food are both 
“chosen and recomposed” as Nyonya cooking. 
 
All three papers pointed out that to understand 
how hybrid and interconnected identities were 
constructed in Malaya, Malaysia, and Singapore 
we must look closely at materiality, at the 
admixture of actual things—on the ground, in the 
vegetable gardens, in the markets, in the cooking 
pots, and in the orchards—to see how 
globalization affected the realm of the 
unrecorded, in everyday lived experience. Each 
Berita	 8 
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of the papers entered that space vividly: Cheong 
Soon Gan explored the smells, tastes, the chaos 
of markets to gain insight into the deep impress 
that the senses make in establishing Western 
colonial identities. Chee Kien Lai’s paper 
described the literal consumption and 
internalization of a fruit that, reimagined, 
connected the overseas Chinese to places they 
had left and new places they sought to inhabit. 
In Mareike Pampus’ paper, the deep corporeal 
experience of chopping, frying, grinding, and 
cooking in the nynonya kitchen revealed how 
chefs both shared or held back the secrets of 
cultural and ethnic difference and belonging in 
their recipes. 
 
In addition to exploring the concrete experience 
and the materiality of food and fruit, the papers 
also addressed the crucial notion of cultural 
expertise. The British colonial family in Cheong 
Soon Gan’s paper had to be fed and sustained—
if they were to survive in Malaya—by a multi-
racial cast of experts who were capable of “rising 
to the challenge of feeding Europeans without 
access to European ingredients” but doing so in 
a way that not only changed the European way 
of eating and tasting, but also connected the local 
to the rest of the world—leading to familiarity, 
to new forms of expertise, and finally to the point 
at which groups in colonial spaces embraced the 
other as the norm. Chee Kien Lai’s paper 
addressed how expertise took shape in the 
everyday—the perfectly rendered overseas 
Chinese painter’s canvas that captured a strange 
fruit and made it known, the experimentation 
with crops and produce until a rambutan, 
however unfamiliar it first was to the diasporic 
Chinese, reminded them of a lychee, and not 
unlike Proust’s famous madeleine, became a way 
for them to recall the sensations and tastes of 
home. 
 
In Mareike Pampus’ paper, we learned that the 
foundation of Nyonya cooking is expert 
knowledge—produced, circulated, and trans-
mitted through women, whose very identity was 
established not just by knowing how to make a 
dish, and how to adjust it, but by demonstrating 
its most precise and refined techniques, marked 
by such things as fingers yellowed by turmeric, 
a trick of salt added at the right moment, and the 
finest possible cut of the kaffir lime leaves.  
 
As a whole, the papers demonstrated how 
Malaya, Malaysia, and Singapore, situated both 
historically and geographically at crossroads of 
trade and migration, were buffeted by regional 
and global strands and provide us with insights 
about culture and identity that go beyond 
modern national boundaries. This panel 
ultimately considered how cultures feed off each 
other and “heat” each other up, or, to extend the 
food metaphor more fully, literally “cook” and 
ingest each other, allowing us to look how 
experiences of the global become specific, local, 
blended, and unique. 
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Article 
 
Social Categorization and Religiously 
Framed State-Making in Brunei: 
From Criminalizing Supernatural Healers 
to the Rise of Bureaucratized Exorcism 
 
Dominik M. Müller 
 
This paper has been presented at the workshop “Social 
Categorization and Religiously Framed State-
Making in Southeast Asia, organized by the author 
together with Matthew Walton and Kevin W. Fogg 
at the Asian Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, 
University of Oxford on June 4-5, 2018. It is a 
shortened and modified version of an article that has 
been published in May 2018 by the Journal of 
Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37(1): 141-183, 
entitled: “Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy in Brunei 
Darussalam: Bureaucratized Exorcism, Scienti-
zation and the Mainstreaming of Deviant-Declared 
Practices.“ The full article is available at: 
https://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1105/1112.  
 
The Special Issue, entitled “The Bureaucratisation of 
Islam in Southeast Asia: Transdisciplinary 
Perspectives”, guest-edited by Dominik M. Müller 
and Kerstin Steiner, contains further MSB Studies-
related articles, including: “Company Rules: Sharia 
and its Transgressions in the Malay-Muslim 
Corporate Workplace” (Patricia Sloane-White), 
“Negotiating Statist Islam: Fatwa and State Policy 
in Singapore” (Afif Pasuni), and “Branding Islam: 
Islam, Law, and Bureaucracies in Southeast Asia” 
(Kerstin Steiner). The issue is available at: 
https://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1100/1107 
 
                                               
1 Research for this article was supported by the German 
Research Foundation’s Emmy Noether Program, the Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology’s Department 
“Law & Anthropology”, the National University of 
Singapore’s Centre for Asian Legal Studies, and Harvard 
University’s “Islamic Legal Studies Program: Law and 
Social Change.” I would like to thank Michael Peletz and 
Lawrence Rosen for their comments. I am indebted to my 
Bruneian interlocutors, and most grateful for the 
 
Introduction1 
The cultural and political position of Islam in 
Brunei is commonly described as conservative 
and orthodox. Portrayals of Brunei as a 
vanguard of “Islamization” have become 
increasingly prominent following international 
media reports in 2014 according to which “the 
Sultan” had “suddenly” decided to “implement 
the Sharia” (sic.). Since the 1980s, the 
government has undeniably formalized an 
increasingly restrictive state-brand of Islam and 
zealously aims to transform its citizenry into 
obedient subjects adhering to state-defined 
doctrines. However, generalized narratives of 
growing Islamization and orthodoxy explain 
little about the complex realities, social 
meanings and discursive embeddedness of 
Brunei’s Islamization policies, and how actors 
position themselves towards and within these 
processes and thus engage in everyday forms of 
the (un-)making and re-making of religiously 
framed state power. 
 
Elsewhere, I have conceptualized the bureau-
cratization of Islam (BoI) as a social phenomenon 
that transcends its organizational boundaries, as 
categorical schemes of Islam diffuse into society 
and become appropriated (and potentially 
transformed) by social actors and institutions 
(Müller 2017). In settings such as Brunei, where 
governments have empowered Islamic 
institutions to influence Muslim discourse, the 
BoI often penetrates deeply into public discourse 
and everyday life in society. Therefore, the BoI 
is not simply a formalization, expansion and 
diversification of Islamic institutions, or a 
government attempt to control religious actors 
and neutralize opposition. It also affects socio-
cultural transformations and subject formations, 
exceptional openness of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
the MIB Supreme Council’s Secretariat, and Darusysyifa’ 
Warrafahah, each of whom helped me with my research and 
gave me access to documents and data, while tolerating, as 
we spoke about explicitly, that my interpretations will 
likely differ from some of their positions. Most names other 
than public figures are pseudonyms, and some 
circumstantial information has been changed to protect 
identities.  
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although it does not determine them. The BoI 
furthermore goes along with a bureaucratization 
of knowledge and related processes of 
systematizing and reflecting, which Eickelman 
calls an “objectification of Muslim 
consciousness,” resulting in “a significant 
reimagining of religious and political 
identities.” 2  Accordingly, the BoI implies 
distinct epistemic modes of understanding and 
organizing the world. These fuse with other 
registers and transnational flows, alongside 
discursive frames of the nation state, and give 
rise to new cultural forms and social meanings of 
Islam. 
 
The BoI is entrenched in the empowerment of 
“state forms of classification” and their “social 
frameworks of perceptions,” “understanding, 
“appreciation” and “memory” (Bourdieu 
1994:13), which are inscribed to varying extents 
into the spheres of habitus. The state’s 
classificatory power is therefore not simply 
produced by state actors (in the term’s 
conventional sense), but co-produced and contested 
in society (Müller 2017), while the boundaries 
between state- and non-state spheres are 
blurring. In this sense, in certain contexts non-
state actors become state-actors as well. 
Accordingly, symbolic power, of which state 
power and state-imposed social classification are 
manifestations, “presupposes, on the part of 
those who submit to it, a form of complicity 
which is neither passive submission nor a free 
adherence to it” (Bourdieu 1991:50–1). Social 
actors within and beyond the bureaucracy 
position themselves in diverse ways: they do not 
simply internalize state-classification to a 
“taken-for-granted” and “commonsensical” level 
(Handelman & Shamgar-Handelman 1991:294), 
or circumvent, pragmatically adapt, subversively 
resist, or cautiously navigate between “public” 
and “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990), although 
                                               
2  Following this concept, Islam “has implicitly been 
systematized ... in the popular imagination, making it self-
contained and facilitating innovation. Questions such as 
‘What is my religion?’, ‘Why is it important to my life?’, and 
‘How do my beliefs guide my conduct?’ have become 
foregrounded in the lives of  large numbers of  believers ... 
These transformations also mean that ‘authentic’ religious 
all of this likely occurs and affects individual 
subject formations. Of most relevance here, they 
also ascribe their own meanings to hegemonic 
discourses and creatively re-signify them, which is 
only partly conditioned by existing power-
knowledge regimes. Actors may submit to 
symbolic state power and participate in its social 
production simultaneously inform some of its 
contents in originally unanticipated ways. This 
paper illustrates such creative state-making with 
the example of an Islamic healing center that 
incorporates the symbolic language and 
categorical schemes of state power in Brunei. It 
specializes in exorcism, which had long been the 
domain of Malay supernatural specialists whose 
once-normalized practices have become 
bureaucratically categorized as deviant; growing 
segments of the population have internalized 
this position as commonsensical Islamic. In this 
context, the BoI affects cultural changes and 
everyday normativities, but it also informs 
agency and creative realizations of the state. 
 
Classificatory Power in the MIB State  
Brunei has been conceptualized by its 
government as a non-secular “Islamic State” and 
“Malay Islamic Monarchy” (Melayu Islam Beraja) 
since Independence in 1984. It never established 
a parliamentary democracy. Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah embodies state power more than any 
other Southeast Asian leader: he is the prime 
minister, minister of finance, of defence, of 
foreign affairs and trade, holds absolute 
executive powers, and is “head of the official 
religion,” i.e. Islam. Constitutionally, he “can do 
no wrong in either his personal or any official 
capacity.” The sultan enjoys enormous 
popularity and, as Bourdieu noted on states more 
(maybe too) generally, personally serves as the 
country’s “(central) bank of symbolic capital.”3 
This popularity is not just fostered, 
choreographed and demanded by state-
tradition and identity are foregrounded,” but also 
“questioned, and constructed rather than taken for granted” 
(Eickelman 2015:605). 
3  He strikingly resembles the “President” acting as the 
Mauss’ian “sorcerer” in Bourdieu’s (1994:11–12) essay on 
“structure and genesis in the bureaucratic field, also 
pertaining to the “monopoly over nomination”. 
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controlled institutions and media, it is also an 
undeniable (in a double-sense) social fact that 
contributes to upholding the political status quo. 
Another stabilizing factor is the oil-funded high 
living standards. The Sultan is widely 
considered to personally provide Brunei’s 
welfare state as a “caring monarch,” a 
discursively naturalized term that is normative 
for public speech. Poems and patriotic songs, e.g. 
those played in state-media during the sultan’s 
three week-long birthday celebrations, similarly 
emphasize his benevolence and artistically 
reproduce the caring monarch motif. 4  With 
compelling arguments: There is no personal 
income tax, a pension for all citizens from the age 
of 60, and largely free education and medical 
services. 
 
FIGURE 1: Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s 71st Birthday 
Celebrations (Hari Keputeraan ke-71), July 15, 2017. Bandar 
Seri Begawan. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©  
 
The “hierarchical reciprocal relationship 
between the ruler and his subjects” (Siti 
Norkhalbi 2005:247) is also framed as 
representing a “traditional Malay” principle 
according to which the ruler must be just, the people 
must be loyal. Despite standing above the law, the 
Sultan is not perceived as an arbitrary ruler or 
dictator by any significant societal grouping. 
With his promotion of the rule of law and 
accountability, his rule comes closer to what 
                                               
4  These activities also include patriotic competitions by 
artists, graffiti sprayers, poets, musicians and dancers, who 
create spaces of  agency for themselves, simultaneously 
enabled and restricted by the event’s royal/patriotic/state-
controlled context (as I describe in forthcoming work on 
Turner (2015) calls soft-authoritarianism in the 
Singaporean context. 
 
Institutionalizing a National Ideology: 
Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) 
The government seeks to instill a “national 
ideology” called Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) in the 
population’s minds and behavior. MIB privileges 
Malay supremacy, Islam (as interpreted by the 
state, no other Islam), and the monarchy. As a 
bureaucratic categorical scheme, MIB is at the 
heart of the state’s attempted exercise of 
classificatory power. Officially, MIB has been in 
place since the first Sultan converted to Islam in 
1368. In the Declaration of Independence, the 
Sultan proclaimed Brunei “shall be forever a … 
Malay, Muslim Monarchy upon the teachings of 
(Sunni) Islam.“ MIB became institutionalized, 
and Brunei-specific notions of Melayu, Islam, and 
the monarchy became translated into the 
language of bureaucracy. In 1986, an MIB 
Concept Committee was established, 
transformed in 1990 into the MIB Supreme 
Council. Since 1991/2, MIB classes are 
compulsory in schools and universities. 
 
The MIB Supreme Council is defining, 
systematizing and propagating MIB. It prepares 
curricula, teaching materials, and publications. 
Its Secretariat constantly reminds citizens of 
their obligations towards the MIB State (Negara 
MIB). One of its leaders, Muhammad Hadi 
Muhammad Melayong (2013), argues that 
MIB’s “values ... are innate for every Bruneian,” 
a descriptive claim and normative expectation. 
In a former Minister of Education’s words: 
“Every individual is responsible for practicing, 
appreciating, and strengthening the concept of 
MIB” (Dewan Majlis 2014:473). The 
government insists on exclusively defining MIB 
(its “interpretation must be protected”). MIB 
propagation underwent various changes. It is 
presently taught in a more interactive and 
activating manner, resembling transnational 
the Royal Birthday). This can also be considered everyday 
forms of, to varying extents religiously framed, state-making, 
which are embedded in wider discursive arenas of  locally 
unique Brunei-specific state-making. 
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pedagogical trends. Learners should become 
“multipliers.“ The Council tries to “maximize” 
quantified “success rates.” Another new trend is 
to encourage “critical thinking”—about how to 
strengthen MIB. The Council pursues “five-year 
working plans” and distinguishes eight 
propagation fields and target groups. By 
“educationally empowering” these groups to 
themselves empower MIB, the authorities seek 
to make the BoI transcend its institutional 
boundaries: MIB should not simply be state-
dictated and obeyed, but society should actively 
strengthen it and thus co-produce the state’s 
classificatory power. As the Council also 
integrates other institutions and companies 
under a “multi-agency approach,” boundaries 
between state, society and the market blur in 
many ways and the MIB-State takes a 
paramount interest in fostering a state-in-
society understanding of good citizenship. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Secretariat of the MIB Supreme Council, 
Located at the University of Brunei Darussalam’s Campus, 
Gadong. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©  
 
The Council’s outreach includes e.g. lectures, 
courses, briefings, exhibitions, camps, 
competitions and media propagation. Bruneians 
are intensely exposed to MIB discourse and its 
normative expectations for public and private 
behavior. They are not only subject to control 
and disciplining, but also to the MIB discourse’s 
everyday didactics and meaning-production. Even 
those who circumvent or deliberately resist the 
state’s pedagogical aspirations can rarely evade 
being affected by its symbolic power and 
classificatory practices. For Bruneians below 40, 
the MIB-educated generation, being MIB 
citizens and being expected to present 
themselves as such in certain spaces has become 
inscribed, to varying extents, into their habitus. 
This is often accompanied by equally 
habitualized hidden transcripts, negotiations and 
insecurities, also among MIB propagators. 
Nevertheless, MIB deeply affects their 
lifeworlds. 
 
The Firewall of MIB and its Supernatural 
Counterforces 
As the Bruneian scholar Asiyah az-Zahra Ahmad 
Kumpoh (2011:39) put it, somewhat 
paradoxically, in post-colonial Brunei the “status 
of religious tolerance ... remained unchanged,” 
but there have been “cultural changes where 
activities ... which did not conform to Islamic 
teaching could no longer be tolerated.“ This may 
be a logical contradiction for the uninitiated 
(“tolerance unchanged” vs. “can no longer be 
tolerated”), but for many Bruneians it is not. It 
sums up two locally powerful themes:  1) feeling 
misrepresented by foreigners as intol-
erant/radical, whereas in reality, Bruneian Islam 
would be “moderate” and oriented towards 
“harmonious” relations with everybody; and 2) 
the banning of supernatural traditions that long 
have been central to everyday life. The latter, in 
the now hegemonic logic, is not a question of 
freedom of religious practice and thus 
(potentially) tolerable, but of protecting the very 
essence of Islam and Muslim souls. 
 
In 2015, the Sultan famously called MIB a 
“firewall” against unwanted elements of 
globalization invading Brunei. The itself 
globalized metaphor’s underlying idea points to 
a long-standing view contrasting Brunei 
Darussalam (Abode of Peace) with a “zone of 
disorder” (Braighlinn 1992:51, 57) abroad. 
Undesired “external” elements are not just 
alternative readings of Islam, militant ideologies, 
non-Muslim missionaries, and “immoral” or 
“Westernized” behaviors, they also pertain to 
“widely accepted symbolism(s)” of the 
supernatural, which are deeply rooted in the 
Malay “cultural vocabulary” (a term borrowed 
from Herzfeld 1992:57). One “no longer 
tolerable” tradition that Asiyah az-Zahra Ahmad 
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Kumpoh (2011:50) mentions are “[c]elebrations 
at spirit shrines” (Müller 2017). The Islamic 
bureaucracy conceptualizes the state as a 
protector of Muslim souls: It is obliged and 
accountable towards God to realize the principle 
of enjoining good and forbidding wrong. Nowadays, 
the Malay mainstream similarly views many 
banned traditions as deviant and/or outdated. 
This view was fostered by state-Islamic 
education, but also takes inspiration from 
bottom-up trends. Other deviant-declared 
practices are certain Malay customs (adat) e.g. in 
wedding ceremonies, dances, dress, and some 
royal regalia. A government khutbah sermon 
recently told Muslims not to shake hands with 
members of the opposite sex who are not their 
spouses or certain relatives (mahram), an 
instruction that many, including state elites, 
ignored, and which is not enforced. In other 
fields, the bureaucracy takes action: A striking 
example is supernatural specialists/healers 
(bomoh). Their status has changed from “an 
indispensable figure in a Malay village” whose 
existence was largely “taken for granted” (Mohd 
Taib 1988:157) to a shadowy criminal figure who 
engages in syirik (sin) and khurafat (superstition, 
but the translation is misleading). Although the 
social institution of bomoh has long been widely 
accepted, under the MIB State’s claim to 
classificatory power, it can, officially and under 
that term, no longer be tolerated, resulting in far-
reaching changes in everyday lifeworlds. Bomoh 
as a social institution, and certain individuals in 
particular have always been surrounded by 
ambivalence, due to their fascinating but 
suspicious access to invisible worlds (Peletz 
1993:155). This ambivalence has been 
restructured and revalorized vis-à-vis policies 
that aim to govern individual practices/beliefs, 
and in ways that focus on the negative side of 
things. Thus, this transformation pushed 
forward by “state actors” engaging in social 
categorization is not a historical rupture per se, 
although the changes are dramatic. 
 
Social Imaginaries and Bureaucratized 
Representations of Black Magic 
Notwithstanding these normative shifts, beliefs 
in the omnipresence of sorcery remain integral 
to social imaginaries and ontological realities. 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) officers 
showed me two exhibitions of confiscated magic 
objects: All had been “cleaned, as officer Khairul 
explained. Yet, sounds had come from the room 
after dark, nobody would enter it at night. He 
also narrated how a MoRA scholar had tested a 
talisman for “academic” purposes: “it worked, he 
was unable to cut his skin.” 
 
Opened in 2007, a theme room called “Objects 
Leading to the Deviation from the True 
Doctrine” became the MoRA’s most popular 
exhibition. The purpose was pedagogical, to 
explain “what is prohibited, what you cannot do, 
and cannot sell.” Khairul added, “20 years ago, 
Islamic education was not as strong as now.” In 
particular, some elders would still trust bomohs 
and practice deviant traditions, although this 
would gradually change since the 1990s. Some 
exhibited objects had been used for protection 
from other people’s magic, for business profits, 
love magic, or to become temporarily invisible or 
invincible. There were protective bottles with 
mystical symbols, numbers and Arabic letters 
that “offenders” place above doors, and 
cooking/eating bowls with inscribed chants, 
kept in restaurants to enhance revenues. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: “Exhibition of Objects Leading to the 
Deviation from the True Doctrine (akidah)”. Ministry of 
Religious Affairs. Picture by Dominik M. Müller © 
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FIGURE 4: Confiscated Objects Assumedly Used for 
Magic Practices, on Exhibition for Educational Purposes. 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Bandar Seri Begawan. Picture 
by Dominik M. Müller ©. 
 
Some restaurant owners had been elderly 
Malays “who still believe in such methods.” 
Khairul himself had investigated such a case. 
Elders would stop once they were “strongly 
exposed” to the “right information.” Other 
objects are protective rings, often found in a 
suspicious mix, e.g. wrapped in yellow cloth 
indicating “worshipping.” When objects are 
confiscated at post offices or borders, they are 
sent to the MoRA for investigation. Some are 
“harmless,” others are “used for special purposes, 
although owners themselves often don’t exactly 
know what.” Usually no legal action is taken but 
they remain confiscated. At the second 
exhibition of objects confiscated within the 
country, officers showed me pictures of a 
graveyard where photographs of a target person 
of sorcery had been buried, wrapped in 
underwear. They regularly find pictures. An 
officer joked, “we confiscate so many, we 
sometimes know the people on them, possibly it’s 
one of us!” This concerns many Bruneians: An 
MIB officer told me how friends recommended 
him not to use a photograph on Facebook, it 
could be used by enemies. 
 
 
FIGURE 5: A Picture that Went Viral in Brunei in 2015, 
Reportedly Used to Harm a Civil Servant Named Hassan 
through Black Magic, Confiscated by Religious Authorities. 
Source: Social Media. 
 
Arif, a Doctrine Control officer argued 
“theoretically bomoh practice can be good if it is 
not against Islam.” If a hospital is far away, a 
good bomoh, who, he added, should rather be 
called orang pandai, might provide helpful herbs. 
But even well-intentioned orang pandai would 
often unintendedly engage spirits/demons. 
There is no consensus what defines the 
difference between bomoh and orang pandai and 
whether they are necessarily “deviant.” The trend 
is to categorically view bomoh as deviant and 
orang pandai more undecidedly with mixed 
suspicion and admiration. Bomoh do not call 
themselves bomoh anymore, as the term has 
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acquired a de-legitimizing stigma. Some are 
called Cikgu/Ustaz (teacher), albeit in one case in 
2017, a healer called himself Yang Keramat Agong 
(“holding superior powers”). Arif estimated 
“hundreds” of remaining bomoh, “70-80% 
foreigners,” mainly Indonesians. Local bomoh 
were mostly elders (“kampung people”), who 
learned “from generation to generation” and 
whose often-unintended deviance was mainly 
about interacting with jin. No next generation 
would follow them any longer. For many 
students, exchanging supernatural stories is part 
of their daily life, and in addition more subtle 
state-influences, some directly refer to state-
power. Ramlee shared with me a “first hand 
story,” of which he was convinced, about a 
certain Prince having a room for his dagger 
collection that was haunted. A keris “stood in the 
room” haunted by several spirits, causing 
troubled family relations. The Prince, following 
the narration, called an Indonesian “good bomoh” 
who “cleaned” the room, performed prayers and 
brought away the keris, refusing any payment. 
Ramlee added that some believed the Prince 
himself has “powers”: “he can walk up walls, like 
Spiderman!” Ramlee also shared a story, known 
by other interlocutors, that the sultan’s late 
father, Omar Ali Saufuddin had supernatural 
powers “like other Sultans before” and could 
control the rain by twisting his moustache. The 
main institution responsible for “controlling” 
religious deviance is the MoRA’s Doctrine 
Control Unit. It organizes surveillance, temporal 
arrests, “faith rehabilitation,” and maintains a 24-
hour hotline. 38 bomoh were arrested in 2004, 55 
in 2005. Later statistics list smaller numbers. In 
2001, first calls proposed bomohs “should 
register” (Borneo Bulletin 2001). Soon afterwards, 
the state’s stance became less ambivalent. 
 
I interviewed Mas and his wife, who spied on a 
bomoh’s community for the MoRA as his 
“helpers.“ Both have attractive private sector 
jobs and narrated their motivation as ethical: As 
the bomoh was cheating and spiritually harming 
his patients/disciples, spying was a “duty.” They 
fulfilled the expectation for good citizens to co-
produce/strengthen the MIB state’s 
classificatory power as “multipliers” in society. 
 
Bomoh cases are normally settled outside of 
courts, through warnings and “voluntary” re-
education called counselling (kaunseling). In fact, 
the authorities focus on “education” and “mercy” 
much more than punishment. Yet, Arif lauded 
that the new Islamic penal code would place his 
work on more solid legal grounds: Muslims 
worshipping “any person, place, nature or any 
object, thing or animal in any manner” contrary 
to Islamic Law, or making “(a)n act or statement 
that shows faith to any object, thing or animal” 
possessing “power,” e.g. “the ability to bring 
good luck, increas(ing) wealth, grant(ing) 
wishes, heal(ing) diseases and others”, could be 
punished by imprisonment, fines and kaunseling. 
(Muslims claiming they “or any other person 
knows an event or a matter that is beyond human 
understanding, contradicting Islamic teachings: 
max. 10 years, caning, repentance; advertising 
black magic: max. 5 years; attempted murder 
max. 10 years, for further details see my original 
article). 
 
Sharia-Compliant Healing, Water-Crystals 
and the Reconfiguration of “Deviant”-
Declared Practices  
Parallel to the socio-legal marginalization of 
bomoh, Brunei witnessed the rise of “Sharia-
compliant” Islamic healing/exorcism. State-
ulama have long conducted such practices 
officially and unofficially, but the most insightful 
example for my analytic purposes, and biggest 
trend, is Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah (DS), an 
institution locally established in 2007. Its model 
was the Malaysian Darusyifa’, founded by the 
late Haron Din, a former Islamic Studies 
professor and Spiritual Leader of the Islamic 
Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, 
PAS). Haron Din was Malaysia’s most 
prominent expert of the invisible world: his 
books were bestsellers, and he was admired 
across political divides. Many Bruneians 
admired him too, including a small group who 
first met him at a dinner at the palace and 
developed the idea of establishing a branch. 
Haron Din repeatedly visited Brunei upon the 
Sultan’s invitation and was “cleared” to 
teach/speak about Islam-related matters. As one 
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of the founders, a former civil servant from the 
education sector, narrated, it took time before 
they were able to receive permission from the 
Registrar of Organisations (ROS). They finally 
set up DS, a “non-state” Islamic organization, 
usually impossible to establish and non-existent 
in Brunei. De facto Haron Din was its supreme 
teacher, but pro forma it is an independent 
organization. Its “governing committee” reports 
all activities to the ROS, and the organizational 
structure follows the ROS’s obligatory pattern 
and bureaucratic terminology.  
 
Brunei’s DS offers a standardized one-year 
curriculum course on the “basics of Islamic 
healing, using Haron Din’s writings. Students 
learn purpose-specific Quranic verses, recitation 
patterns and “ethics.” Their Certificate entitles 
them to practice as volunteers at the center 
and/or privately. In 2014, 500 people were 
actively involved (in 2017, the number had 
grown to 700!), from diverse backgrounds, but 
all were necessarily Muslims. Patients also 
included non-Muslims, e.g. Chinese Bruneians, 
Filipino and Thai guest workers, and a Japanese 
manager who hired DS after spectacular 
“disturbances” in his company. The number of 
certified healers and treated patients/places 
grew annually. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURES 6, 7 & 8: Numbers of Patients Treated, Healers 
Certified and Houses/Offices “Cleaned” by DS Annually in 
Brunei. Source: Courtesy of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah. 
 
DS categorizes three treatment fields: 
“Physical,” “spiritual,” and “disturbances.” 
Disturbances are caused by jin and/or sorcery, 
affect individuals or places, and may result in 
“possession” or “hysteria”. They may also be 
manifested by poisoning, a classical bomoh tool in 
Malay social imaginaries. Sometimes jin 
“accompany” people, some consciously own and 
feed them, until “in the end, the jin owns them.” 
Jin ownership can also be hereditary. During 
exorcism, Muslim jin would often leave the body 
“if they are told in Islamic terms, but not always!” 
Infidel jin are considered more challenging, but 
they can convert, which is utilized in exorcism 
strategies. One should avoid speaking with them 
(“they lie the whole time”), but if they want to 
convert, healers must assist. Jin speaking 
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through possessed patients happened “twice a 
week.” More frequent disturbances are not 
manifested by alien voices. “Often there is no 
clear identification of the cause: jin, syaitan, we 
don’t want to know, what counts is successful 
healing!” 
 
When I visited the center one evening in 2014, 
all 10 treatment rooms were occupied. I 
witnessed a “disturbance” treatment: Maryam’s 
sister had tried to heal her “by copying DS 
without knowing the right method, then a jin 
became involved,” a healer explained. Black spots 
emerged on her skin, she went to DS. A female 
healer exorcized Maryam, who made long 
buzzing noises before throwing up when the jin 
assumedly left her body, a pattern the healer 
expected. I was told this is a dangerous moment. 
In its previous smaller building, spirits 
“sometimes jumped from one person to the 
next.” The situation improved after the DS clinic 
was enlarged, with partitions to provide 
enclosed treatment spaces, partly enabled by 
funding from the private sector, from which DS 
continues to receive donations. After the 
exorcism, Maryam received a mixture of herbal 
leaves and rice powder to shower with. 
Medicines can be purchased but are free for 
patients. In most other cabins, counselling took 
place for issues such as social/family problems, 
to be solved by Quranic rather than traditional 
bomoh means. Many patients visited bomoh before 
they came, a DS healer stated. Common advice is 
to pray the right prayers in the right way, 
remember Allah, and observe Islamic norms for 
social behavior. 
 
                                               
5  In 2010, a “mass hysteria” hit three schools during 
examinations time. Even “teachers” and “the school’s cook” 
were “possessed,” before DS ... solved it. It began when a 
“student cried after seeing a spirit.” A teacher commented 
“the spirit also made several demands. But the religious 
 
FIGURE 9: A Certified Darusysyifa’ Healer Treating a 
Woman Assumed to be “Disturbed.“ Kampong Manggis. 
Picture by Dominik M. Müller © 
 
DS also exorcizes state buildings, e.g. the national 
hospital, university, and an Arabic school for 
girls (closed after mass-hysteria). 5  DS’ first 
graduation ceremony was held at a Ministry of 
Defence building. In return, DS “cleaned” it. 
Disturbances had occurred, particularly after 
dawn: A solider “heard somebody calling him, 
found a man at a table, asked why he had called 
him, suddenly the person was gone!” During the 
exorcism “a door opened and closed by itself, but 
not in the direction in which it would have been 
pushed by the wind, the other direction! Banners 
at the wall were shaking, a lamp stopped 
working.” After the exorcism the disturbances 
stopped. DS also cleaned the Friendship Bridge 
to Malaysia to secure its ceremonial opening. A 
worker had seen “an old Honda Accord” on the 
not-yet-opened bridge occupied by a man and 
expert … told us not to meet the demands as it was the 
voice of  Satan” (ibid.) The acting Minister of  Education 
“advised the school authorities to clean the restrooms, 
believed to be the favorite spot for the spirits …” (see my 
original article for references and further details) 
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child. While asking what they were doing there, 
“the car suddenly vanished.” 
 
But DS’s engagement with state power goes 
beyond state-prescribed bureaucratic forms and 
cleaning jobs. When the first healers graduated, 
the sultan launched a DS event at the 
Convention Centre. His son Prince Malik 
became DS’ “patron.” Princes Sufri and Jefri, the 
sultan’s brothers, also visited DS events. These 
visits expressed royal endorsement and provided 
the locally most powerful form of symbolic 
capital. Photographs in DS annual reports 
documented this legitimation of the highest 
order. DS’s graduation reports share a similar 
structure: A full-page portrait of His Majesty on 
the first page, Prince Malik on the second. In 
2013, the third page carried a text thanking 
Prince Malik and emphasizing popular “trust” in 
DS, adding that “the people” now turn away from 
bomoh. In the first report, a picture showed 
Harun Din standing next to the Sultan, the 
Crown Prince, and Prince Malik, symbolizing 
his royal acceptance. A picture of the State Mufti 
on the same page symbolized the Islamic 
bureaucracy’s equally crucial endorsement. In 
2009 the Mufti, himself a book and fatwa author 
on Islamic healing, inaugurated the year’s course 
with a speech. Some course events were held on 
the MoRA’s premises, which underlines its 
proximity (“blurring boundaries”) to the state’s 
BoI. The DS leaders I spoke with stressed their 
contribution to MIB and the Sultan’s goal of 
Brunei as Negara Zikir (“a nation that always 
remembers Allah”) under his Vision 2035 6 . 
Through all these references to and cooperation 
with state power, DS stages conformity with the 
MIB State’s normative expectations for good 
citizenship, expressed through powerful 
symbolic codes in a specific cultural vocabulary. 
It is a necessary condition for its existence to co-
produce the MIB State’s classificatory power, yet 
its leaders passionately believe in that project. 
                                               
6  In another instance of appropriating powerful state 
symbols in legitimating their work, DS members told me 
how the Sultan once saw a possessed girl at a school in 2005, 
asking the jin: “Why do you possess her? Get out of this 
girl!” He was successful, “because he is the khailfah.” He has 
But through the very act of establishing DS, they 
not only reproduce state power but also inform 
some of its meanings in ways that were neither 
originally planned nor expected by the architects 
of the government’s BoI. They created spaces of 
agency by appropriating symbolic state power for 
their own purposes. 
 
Some certificate holders are ex-bomoh: “Some 
admit it openly,” but DS would not ask about 
“earlier mistakes,” following Haron Din’s advice 
not to expose sins. They believed that the role of 
bomoh was declining due to DS work, state 
education, and the MoRA’s dakwah. As one 
representative stated enthusiastically, “now 
there is an alternative!” There is clearly demand. 
An academic told me how his father had 
practiced traditional healing in the family before 
attending DS’s course to learn the proper way. 
Just like former bomoh, people like him can purify 
and re-legitimize their work vis-à-vis hegemonic 
power-knowledge structures and simultaneously 
protect their souls. The strong interest in the 
services previously provided by bomoh, now by 
DS, results from requirements that persist. 
Peletz (1993:150) described sorcery and 
consulting bomohs in Malaysia as “counterparts 
of formal social exchange” relating to personal 
vulnerabilities and “concerns with autonomy and 
social control.“ Supernatural knowledge (ilmu) 
entails “power to influence other people and to 
maintain one’s autonomy in the face of 
countervailing forces invoked by others who aim 
to limit it,” particularly “in societies in which one 
never really knows what is in the minds of 
others.” In the MIB State, the normative 
parameters for handling such anxieties have 
shifted, resulting in a gap that DS, with its 
bureaucratically certified services, offers to fill. 
 
MoRA officers stressed that “not everything 
labelled DS” was unproblematic; e.g. a bomoh had 
falsely claimed certification. Even certified 
healers would “not all practice the right way.” 
powers, not only over humans, over everything, over all 
makhluk (creations) in his country.” They added: Some 
loggers tell trees, themselves makhluk, creations of Allah, 
they have the Sultan’s permission (compare Skeat 
1900:194).  
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One had touched a woman claiming a jin made 
him do it. Another “misused” a certificate he 
brought to kaunseling to prove his innocence. 
Some “turn to the wrong direction again.” Such 
transgressions indicate yet other modes of 
creating agency by appropriating powerful 
symbols of the state; namely by reference to DS’ 
state-approved bureaucratic certification and the 
authorizing powers it provides (in the age of 
“self-making-by-faking,” Comaroff & Comaroff 
2016:xvii). 
 
DS healing services for free. Patients “can donate 
if they wish” and “pay as much as they like.” 
Bomoh and orang pandai use the same wording. 
DS is funded by donations, but also sells 
products exposed to prayers (herbs, oil, honey). 
This, too, presents an uneven continuation of 
bomoh practices of praying into oil or water, 
although DS views these as entirely different: 
one realizes divine normativity through 
authentic verses, the other engages demonic 
forces, through lacking education or on purpose. 
DS’s bestselling item during in 2014 was prayed-
upon water, stored in large boxes at its premises. 
 
 
FIGURE 10: Pictures of Water-Crystals (“Before” and 
“After Having Been Exposed to Prayers”, and “zam-
zam Water”) Placed at the Walls of DS’ Headquarters. 
Kampong Manggis. Picture by Dominik M. Müller © 
 
 
FIGURE 11: Healing Products (That Have Been Exposed 
to Prayers, sudah dizikirkan) on Sale at DS’ Headquarters. 
Kampong Manggis. Picture by Dominik M. Müller © 
 
DS leaders showed me a PowerPoint 
Presentation visualizing the powers of their 
healing water through microscopic photographs 
of water crystals. DS had sent frozen samples to 
a Japanese water photographer, M. Emoto 
(1943-2014). Emoto was internationally 
renowned among esoteric circles for his water 
experiments. In academia, his work is dismissed 
as pseudo-scientific, to which he once responded 
it was merely art. For my interlocutors, it 
possessed academic character. This added yet 
another cultural register and powerful 
vocabulary of legitimation, which is inherent to 
the BoI: the quest for scientific evidence in the 
construction of facts (Latour & Woolgar 1979), 
and its importance for convincing others. 
Samples included average water, water exposed 
to “4444 prayers” (selawat tafrijiyah), to zikir 
prayers, and zam-zam water from Mecca. Emoto 
assumes water “has a memory” (acoustic/visual): 
Negative influences “break the micro-crystals” 
but water also “remembers” positive influences. 
Going beyond Emoto’s interpretive frame, the 
DS leaders stated “water is a creation of Allah” 
(makhluk Allah). And going beyond established 
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Sunni discourse, they explained water “can hear” 
and “has feelings.” 
 
Emoto compared DS’s samples with others, e.g. 
exposed to rock music. He was fascinated, they 
told me. The pictures left little doubt: Prayed-
upon water exhibited the “most beautiful” 
structures. Other samples had gradually less fine 
structures. Heavy metal-exposed water was the 
“worst, destroyed.” The crystals exposed to zikir 
prayers looked exceptional, but the tafrijiyah-
exposed water (by Haron Din) went even beyond 
that: “Emoto had never seen anything like that!” 
For DS, Emoto’s pictures and the PowerPoint 
presentation visualized the invisible and 
objectively proved their work’s effectiveness. 
The scientific character was also stressed at a DS 
symposium in 2013, attended by Emoto, Haron 
Din, and the State Mufti. Emoto presented a 
“working paper,” “The Science of Beautiful 
Water”. The program, mistakenly calling him 
“Prof.” described Emoto as a “scientific expert” 
(pakar saintifik) presenting “scientific findings.“ 
 
Pictures of water crystals decorated a wall in 
DS’s building. The cover of one graduation 
report also showed crystals. These, and the ideas 
attached to them, had become part of DS’s 
culture of self-presentation. DS’ sold its water 
for 70c. per bottle (“some people drink it every 
day”) as a medicine, and for protection from harm 
or disturbances, which, earlier would have been 
done e.g. through talismans, or water (or other 
natural products) prayed-upon by a bomoh. 
 
Concluding Remarks: Hybrid Pathways to 
State-Imposed Orthodoxy 
As a socio-cultural phenomenon, the BoI in Brunei 
is deeply informed by the MIB State’s discursive 
substrate and its political economy. Boundaries 
between state and society are in many ways made 
blurring through educational means, and by 
non-state actors themselves who appropriate the 
state’s powerful symbolic forms and bureaucratic 
schemes. Therefore, the BoI informs social and 
cultural transformations, as the state’s 
classificatory schemes diffuse into society and 
become actively embedded in everyday 
lifeworlds. Yet, the BoI does not simply 
determine these transformations, as the case of 
DS and the creative agency involved illustrates. 
Such appropriations of (symbolic) state power do 
not simply reproduce it, but also often serve to 
ascribe new meanings to it and thus engage in 
their own modes of religiously framed state-
making. The politics of self-declared orthodox 
purification become creatively re-embedded into 
both pre-existing cultural vocabularies and the 
discursive arena of the nation state, while 
simultaneously drawing upon transnational 
cultural flows from multiple sources. Some 
deviant-declared practices become reinvented 
within the symbolic parameters of the MIB 
State, alongside the more universal languages of 
bureaucracy, cultural globalization, modern 
nationalism, marketization, and scientization, 
statisticalization and technocratization (see e.g. 
Greenhalgh 2008), among various other 
hybridized registers. The reconfiguration at play 
here departs from, but goes beyond what 
Herzfeld (1992:35, see my original article for 
further discussion) calls “the organic part played 
by symbols in creating the new order out of the 
old”: The MIB State’s BoI, as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon, of which bureaucratized exorcism 
is one of many manifestations, here also 
integrates a vertiginous mixture of other 
influences, such as Japanese water-photography, 
the objectifying powers of PowerPoint, digital 
metaphors, future-oriented corporate gover-
nance, and transnational trends in pedagogy. 
Such accommodative reconfigurations should 
not be surprising, as they reflect a more general 
global condition. What makes the Bruneian case 
special, among other things, is how the MIB 
State, and “state actors” in the term’s expanded 
sense, seek to purify local culture through 
zealous Islamization policies, yet the pathways 
towards realizing this orthodoxy are remarkably 
hybrid. Such micro-level negotiations of state 
power, and of ascribing/deriving one’s own 
meanings from/to the state, tell a different story 
from the meta-narratives of state-driven 
Islamization that dominate portrayals of Brunei 
and often narrowly draw upon official policies, 
government declarations, and legal provisions. 
Bureaucratized thinking, speaking and planning 
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informs the quest for objectified evidence-
making, as manifested in DS’s case of water-
photography or the MIB bureaucracy’s 
statistical success rates, “visions and missions” 
and five-year-plans, among others. The 
systematization and reflection that Eickelman 
(2015) calls an “objectification of Muslim 
consciousness” form a necessary condition. In 
objectified modes of being Muslim, earlier 
practices and social institutions, such as the 
bomoh, are systematically re-examined vis-à-vis 
their (un)Islamicness. Yet, subsequent 
“abandonments” are culturally productive 
endeavors and should be analyzed as such, 
instead of reproducing their self-idealizing logics 
by describing them in their own terms. The 
alternative would be what Bourdieu et al. 
(1994:1) call “the risk of taking over (or being 
taken over by) a thought of the state, i.e. of 
applying to the state categories of thought 
produced and guaranteed by the state.” 
 
Simultaneously globalized and unique, the MIB 
State has its own “culture of world-making, truth 
making, knowledge-making, state-making, 
nation-making” in a world where actors engage 
in an “endless quest to recapture” what once had 
been “sovereign certainties of modernity, 
certainties that seem to be slipping away, widely 
mourned, irrecoverable” (Comaroff 2016:xiv). In 
this longing for certainties, the more impossible 
it gets to draw fixed boundaries, the more 
passionate (if not desperate) many actors try to 
(re-)install them. The BoI’s quest for objectified 
evidence is integral to such searching for 
undisputable certainties. Yet, social actors 
within and beyond the state apparatus, 
themselves also construct, modify, and 
sometimes challenge the truths of states that 
claim sovereignty over their lives. Members of 
DS in this sense participate in such religiously 
framed state-, nation-, knowledge- and truth-
making processes through creative techniques 
and seek to bring order into a world that they 
perceive as being fundamentally threatened by a 
dialectical interplay of visible and invisible 
disturbances. 
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A New Dawn for Malaysia: 
The Election that Tipped the Balance 
 
Mohamed Nawab Osman, Aida Arosoaie, 
Rashaad Ali, Prashant Waikar, Chan Xin 
Ying and Najwa Abdullah  
 
On May 9, 2018, Malaysians made history. For 
the first time since 1957, the incumbent coalition 
Barisan Nasional (BN) suffered a devastating 
defeat both in the state and federal legislative 
assemblies. With the exception of the then-
opposition’s leader, Mahathir Mohamad, the 
final polls bewildered the wider public, scholars 
and numerous Malaysian politicians. When 
everyone predicted a marginal victory for the 
BN, Mahathir rallied across Peninsular Malaysia 
prophesying that his coalition, Pakatan Harapan 
(PH), would re-write the fate of Malaysian 
politics. The 92-year-old astute politician, also 
Malaysia’s longest serving prime minister from 
1981 until 2003, switched sides in 2015 when he 
broke away from the United Malay National 
Organisation (UMNO), the leading party of BN, 
to form his own political outfit Parti Pribumi 
Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu). And so begins the 
GE14 (14th Malaysian General Election) saga. 
 
The fractionalization of UMNO and the 
Mahathir persona were crucial factors that led to 
BN’s defeat, but they were not the most 
important. Instead, two other issues emerged as 
key factors of this election which informed the 
electorate’s change of heart, and government. 
Firstly, voters across all states complained about 
the rising cost of living, blaming it squarely on 
the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST). This explains the markedly populist 
nature of the different political parties’ 
manifestos. The BN manifesto proposed 
establishing a special bank to facilitate loans for 
affordable and low-cost housing priced 
RM300,000 and below.1  The PH promised to 
                                               
1  “Bersama BN Hebatkan Negaraku,” Barisan Nasional, 
April 7, 2018, https://www.barisannasional.org.my/wp-
abolish the GST, while PAS has offered to 
provide monthly financial assistance and cash 
incentives to single mothers, the youth and the 
poor. Secondly, race and religion remained 
important considerations for many voters, even 
if explicitly or implicitly acknowledged. BN 
continued playing the religious card in trying to 
win the support of Muslim voters especially in 
the northern states. The UMNO incumbent 
Chief Minister of Terengganu promised the 
party would allow for the implementation of 
hudud in the event of its victory. PAS has also 
invoked religion in its campaign within 
Kelantan, describing the party’s struggle to hold 
the Kelantanese government as a jihad (holy 
struggle). Fearing a potential tacit under-
standing between Parti Islam Se-Malaysia 
(PAS)—the country’s main Islamist party—and 
UMNO, which would lead to further decimation 
of their rights, many non-Muslim voters chose 
to support the Pakatan Harapan. The decision 
was mostly based on PH’s apparently more 
inclusive policies vis-à-vis the management of 
religion. The use of religion was not limited to 
Muslim politicians. In Sabah, Maximus Ongkili, 
a member of the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), 
joined a prayer session with church leaders at his 
residence to pray for this victory in the polls. 
Yet, beyond contextualized strategic use, neither 
BN, PH nor PAS made race and religion the 
focus of their manifestos. However, the results 
emphasized the continued relevance of these 
issues, as they informed both parties’ choice of 
fielding candidates and the electorate’s 
preferences. 
 
Rotting From Within:  
UMNO’s Fractionalization  
In 2015, the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad 
(1MDB), a strategic development fund managed 
entirely by the Minister of Finance, made 
headlines worldwide as one of the biggest 
corruption cases in the world. Former Prime 
Minister Najib Razak, the Chairman of the fund, 
was accused of having siphoned USD$700 
million from the investment fund into his own 
content/uploads/2018/04/Manifesto-Barisan-Nasional-
Bersama-BN-Hebatkan-NegaraKu-Malay.pdf   
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account. The US Justice Department filed a 
lawsuit against Najib, revealing that most the 
money was spent on purchases of yachts and 
properties, jewelry, Picasso and Van Gogh 
paintings and the production of two Hollywood 
movies. 2  In a shocking move Mahathir left 
UMNO to form his own party, Bersatu, as a sign 
of protest against Najib’s misconduct: Mahathir 
claimed he was too embarrassed to be associated 
with a corrupt party.3 
 
With Bersatu joining the opposition, Mahathir 
had to join hands with Anwar Ibrahim, his 
former Deputy Prime Minister whom he ousted 
and subsequently jailed in 1998 on charges of 
corruption and sodomy. 4  They formed a 
leadership configuration which turned out to be 
defining for GE14. Their dynamic can be better 
understood as a contest of masculinities, wherein 
both Mahathir and Anwar, the former notorious 
for his iron fist rule from 1981 until 2003, 
adopted distinctively feminine traits to mark the 
state of the emergency of the country: Mahathir 
released a video in which he wept while 
expressing his remorse for supporting Najib’s 
political ascendancy, 5  and both Mahathir and 
Anwar forgave each other, labelling their 
gesture as a sacrifice for the Malaysian people.6 
At the core of the matter, they both highlighted, 
lied million Malaysians, with an emphasis on the 
Malays, whom Najib betrayed with his corrupt 
behavior. 
 
The state of Johor, a semi-urban state with a 
mixed ethnic population, provides a useful 
example for examining national trends at the 
state level. Barisan Nasional suffered significant 
defeats in Johor, a state it has traditionally 
dominated.7 Pakatan Harapan (PH) succeeded in 
                                               
2 H. Ellis-Petersen (2018), “Malaysian PM claims there was 
no wrongdoing in 1MDB scandal,” The Guardian, April 26. 
3 “I will never return to ‘badly damaged’ UMNO, says Dr 
Mahathir,” The Malaysian Insight (2017), July 28. 
4  T. Pepinsky (2018), “Can Mahathir Mohamed be 
Malaysia’s First Democratically Elected Prime Minister?” 
Asia Unbound, Council for Foreign Relations. 
5 “2018 Dr. Mahathir Cried (Touching),” Youtube, April 28, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3dhMBQLKgU  
6  H. Ellis-Petersen (2018), “’This election is personal’: 
Mahathir Mohamad, 92, vows to stop ‘corrupt’ protégé,” 
winning 18 of 28 parliamentary seats, building 
on their five seats from the last general election 
in 2013. At the state assembly level, PH won 36 
of the 56 seats. This became 39 seats after three 
UMNO state assemblymen switched to PH, thus 
giving the coalition two-thirds majority.8 BN’s 
defeat in Johor can be attributed to two main 
factors: former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s 
unpopularity and cost-of-living issues. Due to 
the various scandals surrounding his 
administration, Najib’s unpopularity proved too 
much to stave off the image the Barisan Nasional 
state government in Johor had carefully curated. 
Much of the campaign was dedicated to the 
successes of the state government, employing 
the state-level nationalism of Bangsa Johor to 
specifically appeal to Johorean’s identity and co-
opting this in their favor. The state government 
went to great lengths to divorce their image 
from Najib, which included eschewing Najib’s 
image on their campaign material from 
brochures to billboards, creating their own 
detailed manifesto, and not inviting him to Johor 
during the campaign period.9  BN was already 
experiencing a downward voting trend in the 
past two elections, including in traditional 
Malay/Felda areas while many seats particularly 
at the parliament level were marginal. 10  So, 
although BN was expected to lose some seats, 
the extent of their losses is truly significant 
especially given the efforts made by the local 
administration to disassociate themselves from 
the federal government. Despite this, Johor 
citizens issued a protest vote against Najib at the 
ballot box. 
 
The results in Sabah, one of the two East 
Malaysian states, further emphasized this point. 
The Guardian, May 2. 
7 F. E. Hutchinson (2018), “GE-14 in Johor: The Fall of  the 
Fortress?”, Trends in Southeast Asia, No.3. 
8  Amar Shah Mohsen (2018), “Don’t rush decisions, 
prioritise party members, Muhyiddin tells Johor MB,” The 
Sun Daily, May 16.  
9 R. Ali (2018), “Commentary: To win over Johor voters, 
politicians compete to represent the Johor identity,” 
Channel NewsAsia, May 8. 
10 F. E. Hutchinson (2018), “GE-14 in Johor: The Fall of  the 
Fortress?”, Trends in Southeast Asia, No.3. 
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In the 2013 Malaysian General Election (GE13), 
Barisan Nasional won 88% of Sabah’s 
parliamentary seats and 80% of the state 
assembly seats.11 In Sarawak, the other state in 
East Malaysia, BN won over 80% of the federal 
seats. 12  GE14 saw a dramatic shift in BN’s 
electoral fortunes. It won just 40% of federal 
seats and 48% of state seats in Sabah.13  Since 
then, the Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan)-PH 
pact formed the state government after a BN 
component party United Pasok Momogun 
Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO) 
defected, an episode equally dramatic as the 
formation of Bersatu.14 In Sarawak, BN won only 
60% of federal seats. These trends are self-
explanatory given that, traditionally, East 
Malaysia has been referred to as a “fixed deposit” 
for BN. Considering that, collectively, Sabah, 
Sarawak, and the Federal Territory of Labuan 
account for 57 federal seats, or nearly 26% of the 
federal legislative, East Malaysian votes have 
historically been particularly important for BN’s 
efforts to retain the federal government. Based 
on this, observers of Malaysian politics predicted 
that, while PH would likely perform well in 
Peninsular Malaysia—perhaps even better than 
in GE13—it would make dismal inroads into 
East Malaysia, even if it had secured an electoral 
pact with the Parti Warisan Sabah. 15  This 
renders BN’s poor performance in East Malaysia 
particularly significant to note. To understand 
how this came to be, the interplay between local 
and national politics needs to be interrogated. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of GE14, talk of 
defections within BN Sabah was rife. Parti 
Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS) quit the coalition, 
                                               
11 G.K. Brown & R. Lim (2013), “Report 5: General Election 
2013: Sabah,” in K.B. Teik ed., 13th General Election in 
Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and Implications,” IDE-JETRO. 
12 Khoo Boo Teik (2013), “Report 1: 13th General Election 
in Malaysia: Overview and Summary,” in K.B. Teik ed., 13th 
General Election in Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and 
Implications,” IDE-JETRO.  
13  Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (2018), “Statistik 
Keseluruhan Bagi Parlimen PRU14,” ibid. (2018) “Statistik 
Keseluruhan Bagi DUN PRU14.”  
14 A. Azhar (2018), “Six switch sides, Warisan has majority 
with 35 seats,” Malaysiakini, May 11.  
and both UPKO and the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) defected to the Warisan-Pakatan 
alliance. 16  The sudden fluidity of political 
alliances pointed out already existing structural 
fissures within BN Sabah, which were probably 
hitherto placated by relatively large election 
wins. Most likely, the waning support for BN in 
GE13—nearly a third of wins were marginal—
led to internal frustration within the coalition 
over electoral strategies and envisioned goals.17 
Such frustrations were accentuated by the 
departure of Shafie Apdal from BN, a former 
UMNO Vice-President and former Minister, 
who in 2015 quit Najib’s administration to found 
Warisan and enter into an electoral pact with 
PH. Apdal’s decision rattled BN Sabah, just as 
Mahathir’s defection rattled UMNO in 
Peninsular Malaysia. In light of this, Warisan 
made Shafie central to its election campaign by 
highlighting him as the champion the Sabahans’ 
rights, while juxtaposing him against Musa 
Aman, whom many accused of complicity with 
the federal government for disregarding 
pertinent issues concerning Sabah.18 
 
A Veritable Malaysian Tsunami  
Another important factor which caused BN’s 
poor performance at the federal level fared was 
its failure to engage what emerged as the voters’ 
most important consideration during this 
election: the rising cost of living and inflation, 
manifestations of which are the GST and the 
government’s corruption scandals. For example, 
Serina Abdul Rahman remarked that many of the 
rural Malay voters in Johor declared their switch 
of allegiance from UMNO to PH as temporary: 
while still UMNO supporters at heart, many 
individuals cast against Najib and the GST.19 
15 A. Puyok & P. Waikar (2018), “Why it is unlikely that 
Sabah will swing to the opposition,” Today, May 8. 
16 Malaysiakini (2018), “PBRS is third party to leave Sabah 
BN,” May 12. 
17 G.K. Brown & R. Lim (2013), “Report 5: General Election 
2013: Sabah,” in K.B. Teik ed., 13th General Election in 
Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and Implications,” IDE-JETRO.  
18 Borneo Today (2018), “Musa Aman has failed Sabahans, 
Sabah remains poorest state – Jeffrey Kitingan,” April 19. 
19 Presentation delivered by Serina Abdul Rahman during 
the Asian Research Institute-S. Rajaratnam School of  
International Studies (ARI-RSIS) roundtable “The 14th 
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Contrary to voters’ sentiments, BN’s campaign 
focused on their good track-record in state and 
federal governance, the virtues of a stable 
government, and the potential evil posed by the 
opposition to Malay voters. Yet, BN’s 
dissonance with the grievances of the larger 
Malaysian public backfired across the country, 
especially as the coalition misunderstood the 
extent of public discontent. Inflation in Johor is 
higher than the national average, and so 
thousands of Malaysians commute daily to 
Singapore in search of a better pay.20 Given the 
low exchange rate between the Singaporean 
dollar and Malaysian ringgit, many Johoreans 
felt disgruntled with their financial situations. In 
Penang, MCA’s strategy of capitalizing on 
China’s One Belt One Road project in Malaysia 
hardly attracted the voters’ attention. Instead, 
voters were more concerned with bread-and-
butter issues, such as GST and toll taxes, which 
constituted the backbone of the Democratic 
Action Party’s (DAP) campaigning. 21  The 
Sabahan Warisan-Pakatan pact and PH Sarawak 
also leveraged on the nationwide anger at the 
GST and corruption issues in order to catalyze 
big swings from BN, especially in Chinese-
majority seats where voting patterns mirrored 
the Peninsular. What is more, parties with a firm 
regional outlook from both Sabah and Sarawak 
were decimated at the polls, suggesting that East 
Malaysian politics is evolving beyond 
parochialism. Amidst these trends, five BN 
candidates in Sarawak and nine BN candidates in 
Sabah won with increased majorities. 22  These 
contradictory patterns indicate that the appeal of 
the individual candidate may matter more than 
party politics in certain constituencies. What is 
                                               
General Election of  Malaysia: A New Dawn for 
Democracy?” June 4, 2018, Singapore.  
20 “Disillusionment with BN grows as inflation goes up in 
Johor”, TODAY, February 21, 2018.  
21 Free Malaysia Today (2018), “Report: Forget the scandals, 
GE14 will be about bread-and-butter issues,” February 13. 
22 The Borneo Post (2018), “GE13 Results: Sarawak”; 
ibid. (2018), “GE13 Results: Sabah (P)”; ibid. (2018) “GE13 
Results: Sabah (State);” Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia 
(2018), “Keputusan Terkini Parlimen Sarawak”; ibid. (2018) 
 “Keputusan Terkini Parlimen Sabah.” 
Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, “Keputusan Terkini 
clear, though, is that BN can no longer afford 
complacency and treat East Malaysia as a vote 
bank. 
 
BN’s campaign content had glitz and high-
quality production, but it ultimately failed to 
connect with the people at an emotional level. 
For example, it was unable to compete with PH’s 
approach that better engaged voters. Campaign 
content appeared sincerer on PH’s end. 
Mahathir’s video to save the country, for 
instance, was perceived as more sensitive to the 
rakyat’s socioeconomic grievances.23 Conversely, 
BN’s campaigns failed to address GST and cost 
of living issues, which were key drivers of 
GE14’s Malaysian tsunami. Instead, it hyped up 
the economy by showing GLC bosses promoting 
BN’s economic track record via the Hebat 
Negaraku song24, along with videos of pro-GST 
citizens and AirAsia CEO Tony Fernandes’ 
crediting his company’s success to the Najib 
administration 25 —all of which gave the 
impression that BN was indifferent to people’s 
concerns and predicaments. These focuses on 
past achievements are unappealing—if not 
irrelevant— to the wired youth whose concerns 
for the country are grounded in anxieties about 
the future. In that case, PH gained momentum 
amongst the youth and angry voters through its 
manifesto and campaign strategies that reflect a 
vehement spirit for reform. BN’s historic loss at 
the hands of PH was a battle lost on various 
fronts, including social media. Compared to 
GE12 and GE13, BN’s social media machinery 
established far savvier campaigns featuring viral 
videos, influencers, trending slogans like 
#Negarakru and #HebatkanNegaraku. 
Nevertheless, this proved to be insufficient to 
Dewan Undangan Negeri Sabah.” 
23 Kini TV (2018), “I will work together with my friends to 
rebuild Malaysia,” April 29. 
24 See: The Star Online (2018), “GLC chiefs show they can 
do music in 'Hebat Negaraku' video,” March 23. 
25 Business Insider (2018), “Tony Fernandes says he owes 
AirAsia’s success as one of  the biggest international brands 
to Najib’s government”, May 7; Free Malaysia Today’s 
Youtube account (2018), “Kejayaan kami kerana dasar 
‘dahulukan rakyat’ pentadbiran Najib,” May 6, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S_zQCA74OQs  
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heal its tarnished image and failed to convince 
enough citizens to vote in its favor. As such, 
social media has not only become an arena for 
drawing more voters and image-building, but 
also a powerful platform for exposing 
wrongdoing and mobilization. Increased 
transparency as made possible by the Internet 
has made it easier for people to perform 
background checks and become more involved in 
civic issues. This sharpened people’s objectivity 
and provided more space for dissents, leading to 
further distrust in BN’s authority. 
 
On the contrary, PH’s social media utilization 
had a profound impact on the youth, influencing 
scores who, despite being first-time voters in 
GE14, decided to support the coalition based on 
previous elections. Therefore, the voter 
turnout—slightly lower at 82.32% compared to 
84.84% in GE13—was dominated by voters aged 
21-39 (41%).26 In addition, social media enabled 
PH overcome its financial disadvantage vis-à-vis 
BN and mobilize large crowds in their ad hoc 
campaign rallies across the country. Meanwhile 
in Kelantan and Terengganu, BN’s reluctance to 
utilize large-scale ceramahs further disconnected 
it from the rural voters. The victory of PAS in 
both states in the absence of a significant social 
media presence also adds to the presumption that 
“personal touch” campaigning, such as ceramahs, 
remains effective and relevant in retaining and 
attracting voters. Given its 28-year experience 
as the lead opposition party with the largest 
membership in Malaysia, PAS managed to 
navigate through different crowds and address 
problems that are important to the locals, such 
as the rising living cost caused by GST, disaster 
management, and costly student loans 
(PTPTN). 
 
GE14 results showed that, contrary to the 
pundits’ expectations, changed occurred not due 
to a Malay tsunami, but due to a Malaysian 
tsunami. This was particularly evident in the 
                                               
26  The Straits Times (2018), “Malaysia's Election 
Commission: Voter turnout at 82.32%, higher than initial 
76%,” May 11. 
27  Suruhan Pilihanraya Malaysia (2018), “SEMAKAN 
mass-scale swing of non-Malay support from the 
component parties of BN—the Chinese-
dominant Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
(Gerakan), the Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) and the Indian-based Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC)—to the opposition. Most 
significantly, MCA president Liow Tiong Lai, 
Gerakan President Mah Siew Keong, and MIC 
president S Subramaniam have lost in Bentong, 
in Teluk Intan, and in Segamat, respectively, to 
PH candidates. Only MCA deputy president, 
Wee Kah Siong, barely survived in the Ayer 
Hitam parliamentary constituency in Johor, 
winning against DAP’s candidate, Liew Chin 
Tong, with a margin of only 303 votes.27 MCA 
has lost most seats that the party held after the 
2013 elections, Gerakan lost Simpang Renggam 
and Teluk Intan, while MIC only managed to 
retain Cameron Highlands, a mixed seat with 
34% of Malay, 32% Chinese and 21% of Indian 
voters won with a margin of 597 votes to PH’s 
DAP candidate. MIC faced the same issues as the 
Chinese political parties, when it lost its 
incumbent parliamentary seats of Tapah, Hulu 
Selangor, and Segamat. In Segamat, Malay 
voters are slightly lesser than Chinese voters, 
44% to 46%, respectively, while the Indian 
community represents around 10%. 
 
In Johor, aside from the Ayer Hitam seat, 
component parties in BN have once again been 
found wanting. MCA and MIC suffered crushing 
defeats particularly in Johor, as voters 
abandoned these parties en masse. Their 
consistent failure to address national issues, such 
as inflation and corruption, caused more Chinese 
support to drift towards the opposition28. Poor 
candidates and misguided election campaigns 
that centered on small local problems 
compounded defeat for a party struggling for 
legitimacy from its core base. The future of MIC, 
Gerakan, and MCA remains unknown, as the 
existence of BN as a coalition is hardly seen after 
the GE14. UMNO itself is experiencing a critical 
KEPUTUSAN PILIHAN RAYA UMUM KE – 14,” May 5. 
28 R. Ali (2018), “Commentary: To win over Johor voters, 
politicians compete to represent the Johor identity,” Channel 
News Asia, May 8. 
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period of transition and fractioning and it is 
uncertain that after the Malay dominant political 
party regrouped, it will be willing to work with 
MCA, Gerakan and MIC as a multi-racial 
coalition again, considering the light weight of 
seats MCA and MIC have in federal. 
Nevertheless, the components need to first 
reflect on their mistakes regarding the failure to 
keep a check and balance within a coalition and 
standing up against an unequal alliance. Despite 
the positive outlook for the opposition coming 
into the election, the extent of BN’s defeat is 
frankly astounding. This indicates that a ‘Malay 
tsunami’ may not be as accurate as a ‘Malaysian 
tsunami,’ as evidenced by the wholesale 
abandonment of MCA and MIC. Nevertheless, 
the presence of Bersatu must be credited with 
turning key seats such as Muar, and Simpang 
Renggam to the opposition on the back of Malay 
support. They presented a viable alternative to 
many Malay voters which made the switching of 
allegiances an easier task.  
 
The Implicit Persistence of Racialized 
Political Agendas 
In a move hailed as the end of racialized political 
agendas, neither BN, PH, nor PAS made race 
and religion the focus of their manifestos. This 
trend was captured by numerous polls and 
surveys ahead of the election which sought to 
measure the sentiments of the electorate. 
Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research revealed 
in December 2017 that, irrespective of race and 
religion, voters’ main considerations for the next 
election would be inflation (68%), corruption 
(36%) and job opportunities (19%). The 
preservation of Malay privilege, while still an 
issue, remained low in the list of priorities, along 
with political instability and the weakness of the 
leadership. The prospect of success for the 
opposition looks equally grim. The poll revealed 
that only 21% of the total respondents appeared 
satisfied with the opposition, and only 13% of the 
interviewed Malay felt the same. Overall the 
Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research 
                                               
29S. Amarthalingam (2018), “Pakatan makes best showing 
in Penang, winning 37 out of  40 seats,” The Edge Markets, 
May 10. 
highlighted the growing dissatisfaction of 
Malaysians with the overall political system. 
Indeed, GE14 results demonstrate the veracity 
of these predictions. Yet, these do not disqualify 
the persistent relevance of race and religion in 
shaping the electorate’s preferences. Much like 
gender dynamics, while race and religion were 
not openly acknowledged, they emerged as 
underlying threads in GE14, informing both the 
fielding and election of candidates. 
 
Uniquely, for the Indian community the MIC 
was no longer viewed as the representative of the 
community. In areas with a strong Indian 
presence such as Batu Kawan, Nibong Tebal, and 
Padang Serai, the PH won these seats by 
whooping majorities. 29  This trend points out 
that the Indian community ceased to vote 
according to ethnic considerations, suggesting 
that the MIC failed to adequately respond to the 
community’s problems. Instead, Indians chose to 
vote for Pakatan Harapan, although the coalition 
did not include an Indian-dominant party. Just 
like MCA, the MIC’s failures to address key 
federal issues such as corruption and patronism 
contributed to its perception of an UMNO-
subservient outfit.30  
 
Unlike Indians, Malaysian Chinese remained 
consistent in their historical voting patterns, 
wherein the party was the key consideration. 
This is reflected in the GE14 results, as the DAP 
won its 42 parliamentary seats, out of the total 
47 contested, in Chinese-majority constit-
uencies. 31  In Penang, even as the state 
government faced severe corruption allegations, 
such as the trial of Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng 
over the undersea tunnel and illegal land sales, 
DAP had won all the 7 parliamentary seats and 
defended all of the 19 state seats contested. 
While DAP focused on the cost of living, a key 
concern for the Chinese community, ethnic-
based parties remain important for the Chinese 
community as can be seen in the strong presence 
of the party in Melaka and Negeri Sembilan. 
 
30  K. Haridas (2017), “The numbers tell a story,” The 
Malaysia Insight, December 28. 
31 Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia (2018).  
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Similar to the Chinese community, in the Malay-
majority states of Kelantan, Terengganu, 
Pahang, Kedah, and Perlis ethnicity and religion 
remained the key issues informing the 
electorate’s political choice. Ahead of the 
elections pundits confidently declared the 
strength of PAS on the decline, especially given 
the party’s split from Pakatan Harapan.32 
 
The Green Belt in Northern Malaysia 
Yet, as predicted by few, the results in Kelantan, 
Terengganu, Pahang and Kedah signal quite the 
opposite: PAS’ political clout expanded 
considerably from the last election. 33  PAS 
managed to remain in control of Kelantan, its 
historical abode, by successfully reclaiming the 
five state seats lost to Barisan Nasional in GE13 
and maintaining its grip of nine parliamentary 
seats. Its strategy focused on trumpeting its 
mission as ensuring the survival of the final 
bastion of Islam in the country. The issue of 
development came out strongly as a BN’s main 
campaigning strategy in Kelantan. BN banked 
on the lack of infrastructure and development in 
Kelantan, Malaysia’s poorest state, and promised 
to build a new stadium, a bridge in the Keterah 
constituency and a university. Yet, to their 
surprise, Kelantanese citizens care less about 
development, a point emphasized by Takyiuddin 
Hassan during an interview in Kota Bharu.34 
PAS responded to BN’s campaign by stepping up 
their religious rhetoric, declaring an electoral 
jihad to defend the state, a strategy which 
resonated better with the Kelantanese than BN’s 
focus on development. PAS also won 
Terengganu with a clear majority, 18 seats, and 
gained two extra parliamentary seats, currently 
holding six seats. Unlike Kelantan, neither Islam 
nor religion featured prominently in the 
manifestos of either UMNO or PAS. In fact, the 
party’s local leadership revamped itself as 
technocratic, offering a comprehensive, rather 
                                               
32 T.H. Yee (2018), “Malaysia Election: Pollster Merdeka 
Center expects BN to win poll, but not popular vote,” The 
Straits Times, May 8; R. Augustin, “Invoke predicts 5 states 
to PH, PAS to lose everything,“ Free Malaysia Today (2018), 
March 10.   
populist manifesto to address the discontent of 
Terengganu citizens over the rising cost of 
living and the introduction of the GST. Yet, 
given that PAS and UMNO remained the sole 
players in the state, also to the detriment of the 
Amanah party, an allegedly moderate split of 
PAS, it is obvious religion and ethnicity remain 
quintessential in shaping voters’ political 
preferences. PAS also made unprecedented 
inroads into Kedah and Pahang, securing 15 
state seats and 8 state seats respectively. PAS’ 
success is especially relevant if understood in the 
wider federal context. While the bread-and-
butter issue, a grievance crossing ethnic, 
religious and class divides, was best vocalized by 
the opposition, a significant number of fence-
sitters and disgruntled UMNO supporters in 
Kedah and Pahang chose PAS over PH. It 
appeared that, in this three-cornered fight, 
religion was the key factor, rather than the cost 
of living. 
 
Conclusion  
GE14 has allegedly shaken Southeast Asian 
politics with an unprecedented democratic 
tsunami. The results highlighted how 
Malaysians mobilized across various socio-
political and economic categories to hold the BN 
government accountable for its widespread 
corrupt behavior and insensible economic 
policies. The overly optimistic accounts of the 
election have been tempered by concerns over 
potential ripples of Mahathir’s autocratic legacy, 
as well as further political patronage. Racialized 
political agendas also remain a big question mark 
clouding this electoral triumph, as PH has often 
been accused for couching racial politics into a 
rhetoric of multiculturalism. Yet, in spite of all 
this, GE14 sent a clear message to electorates 
across the region: whether a vote for PH, against 
BN or against Najib, where there is a will, there 
is a way.  
33 M. Nawab M. Osman (2018), “Commentary: As battle for 
Malay voters heats up don’t expect PAS to go quietly into 
the night,” Channel News Asia, May 4. 
34 Interview with Takiyuddin Hassan, Kota Bharu, May 4, 
2018.  
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Project Report 
 
 
Project M: 
Campaigning with a “Dictator” 
 
Sophie Lemière  
 
Birth of a Project 
In March 2017, I met Mahathir Mohamad in his 
office at the Perdana Foundation in Putrajaya. I 
had interviewed him almost every year since 
2012, and since the creation of his new party 
“Bersatu” in 2016, we have had several informal 
occasions to talk during fund raising dinners and 
other similar events. On that day, I wanted to 
share my idea of a new research project that 
would involve following him extensively. His 
assistant had squeezed me into a tight schedule 
for what I had described as “just a project pitch.”  
 
Mahathir was seated behind his very large desk 
in a very large office. As I entered the room, he 
nodded. No handshake or any form of familiarity, 
as some other politicians would allow themselves 
after many years of interactions. I learned the 
man is cold until he is not, but also that the ice 
may freeze again at any moment. 
 
In a jump-start, I ask, “I would like to follow you 
during your campaign, if you allow me to.” He 
smiles, “Well, we don’t know when elections will 
be. And I’m not a candidate!” I answer in a jovial 
yet confident tone, “I believe you will be.” In a 
slow pace emphasizing every single word, he 
says, “I am just here to contribute, not to be 
Prime Minister.” I slightly pull my shoulders 
straight to the back of the chair, perhaps to add 
a dramatic note and state, “You are not a 
contributor, Sir, you are a leader.“ He smiles 
again, and as a conclusion to a discussion turned 
into negotiation, he adds, “I never say no to a 
reporter”. I managed to quiet the huge “oh là là” 
that crossed my mind.  
 
Slightly offended, to say the least, in my French 
pride, my female pride, or my academic pride (or 
all of the above) I was, for a very short moment, 
unsure of how to position myself. Mahathir has 
never been friendly to journalists and I could not 
start this project on such a perception. I 
wondered in my mind, “Is he not just playing, 
again?” I took a breath and started —without 
really knowing where I would land— “Well, Sir, 
if you don’t mind, I have studied for 12 years and 
suffered 7 years doing a PhD so, please, do not 
call me a reporter. I am a Doctor, like you. I’m 
Dr. Sophie, you are Dr. Mahathir.“ He looked 
both surprised and amused: “True… you don’t 
call me ‘Tun’ like others do. Is that (the reason) 
why?” 
 
A month later, the Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University 
offered me a fantastic fellowship for this project. 
In July, I went back to Malaysia. I was very 
proud to announce to Mahathir Harvard 
University’s interest in the project. I said, “the 
Americans are interested, you see”—I should 
confess, as a French person, the very unsubtle 
objectification of “the Americans” has always 
been an easy tactic to gain the interest of 
Malaysian politicians. Answering my effort to 
reassert my neutrality—despite an American- 
funded project—he sarcastically says: “You can 
do whatever you want; I won’t try to influence 
you. You can even call me a dictator, like others 
do, I don’t mind.”  
 
At this moment, we reached one of the key ideas 
of the project. Although far from the ruler 
portrayed in Sacha Byron Cohen’s movie (The 
Dictator, 2012), Mahathir’s image had long been 
one of a dictator, if not an authoritarian leader. 
This is an image he always said he was 
indifferent to. Ironically, “dictator” is among the 
expressions he has repeatedly used during his 
campaign since resigning from UMNO; often he 
tries to feint indifference by making jokes over 
the fact that he is the “only dictator who 
resigned.”  
 
It now seems like Mahathir’s magic has 
operated. His former heir and arch-enemy, 
Anwar Ibrahim, recently said on the BBC he is 
no longer “the Trump of his days.” This 
incredible change reminds us of Chaplin’s 
fantastic scene in “the Great Dictator” (1940) 
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where a Jewish barber takes the place of the anti-
Semitic, ethnonationalist dictator of “Tomania” 
and declares in a passionate speech to his army a 
new path for the world, a path to universality, 
equality, and justice. Somewhere between 
redemption and denial, pragmatism and 
opportunism, Mahathir is re-writing history: 
after all, what kind of dictator—if not a barber— 
becomes a symbol of democracy?  
 
The Last Game: Gambling with Mahathir 
“The Last Game: Malaysian Politics in the Eye 
of Mahathir Campaign” is a research project I 
conducted during five months in Malaysia, from 
the General Assembly of his party Bersatu on 
December 30th, to his first speech to the Prime 
Minister Office’s staff on May 23rd.  
 
As explained, Mahathir had agreed to the project 
in 2017, but I had to be renegotiate my access 
from time to time. This trip was not first 
encounter with Mahathir, or his circle, but I 
surely had never before been as close to him. For 
the past 20 years or more, only a very protective 
and very tight circle of loyal administrators and 
assistants surrounded the former Prime 
Minister. A few times, more than I wished for, I 
found myself being the collateral damage of 
inner rivalries. Yet my previous experience 
pushing at and literally running after gang’s 
leaders during my PhD days had taught me a few 
tricks to step into exclusive community of power, 
and helped me to stay in the good books of most.  
 
The data collected during these five months 
includes extensive observations, regular 
discussions with Mahathir and his old guards, 
interviews with Bersatu leaders and also 
politicians from other parties, Bersatu regular 
members and part of the political machinery, 
UMNO supporters and leaders, gang leaders 
who switched allegiances from UMNO to PH, 
and business men labelled as “cronies, former 
UMNO cyber-troopers…” The amount of 
information I gathered is tremendous, and I am 
still just on the edge of figuring out how to 
explore the many questions I have in mind. I am 
currently trying to organize thoughts, ideas, and 
data far from the adrenaline of the campaign—at 
this point suggestions from fellow Malaysianists 
or comparatist ethnographers are very welcome! 
 
In a first stage, I will use part of the material to 
update my book manuscript, based on a revision 
of my PhD dissertation on gangs and politics in 
Malaysia (anticipated submission in August). 
During the campaign, I met with many gang 
leaders and members I knew then and new ones, 
whom all have switched allegiances to Mahathir.  
 
The second phase of my work is the writing of 
this new manuscript with the support of the 
Stanford-NUS Lee Kong Chiang Fellowship and 
Harvard’s Ash Center for Democracy. “The Last 
Game” is deeply rooted in empirical material as 
described and revolving around the persona of 
Mahathir: his relationship to politics in general, 
to the public, and also to his close collaborators. 
On another level, this project implies the need to 
reflect on spending so much time with a leader, 
and the evolution of my own perception of him 
brings some interesting aspects. My intention is 
not to make this (perception) a central object of 
study, but rather to contribute to questions 
related to this type of unique experience and as 
an indication of how the political charms of a 
leader may operate. Several questions can be 
addressed and challenged, if not answered, 
through a thorough analysis of this empirical 
material to highlight the underpinning 
structures of the Malaysian political scene. 
 
The project was, like Mahathir’s decision, a 
gamble. If he had not won the election, his entire 
legacy would have fallen through the cracks of 
history—so would have my ambitious project. In 
fact, not many had bet on the old man’s leap of 
faith. However, against all odds, UMNO 
collapsed on the eve of its 72nd anniversary. 
Mahathir’s overwhelming victory slayed 61 
years of an ethnonationalist political monopoly: 
an historic transition for Malaysia from semi-
authoritarian rule to electoral democracy. No 
book can ever perfectly reflect the spontaneity, 
contradiction, and even irrationality of historical 
events that once put in perspective “make sense.” 
Just another leap of (academic) faith. 
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Book Review 
 
Planting Empire, Cultivating Subjects: 
British Malaya, 1768-1941 
(Lynn Hollen Lees, Cambridge University 
Press, 2017) 
 
Craig A. Lockard, University of Wisconsin-
Green Bay 
 
Historians of Malaysia, of Southeast Asia, and of 
the British Empire, as well as informed readers 
in Malaysia, may find this innovative new book 
by Lynn Hollen Lees of great interest. I had the 
pleasure of reading and commenting on early 
drafts of the manuscript. Hence, this is not a 
review as such, since I am not an unbiased 
observer, but I would like to highlight for 
prospective readers some of the book’s strengths 
and insights.  
 
Planting Empire is a fine, well-written, and 
deeply researched work that explores the 
transnational movements and colonial policies 
that shaped British Malaya and its peoples. Lees 
explores how British governance permitted, 
even fostered, cross-cultural exchanges and 
learning between the diverse inhabitants, 
especially on plantations and in towns in the 
more economically developing areas (mainly the 
west coast). But colonial rule also led to racial 
privilege and rigid ethnic differences.  
 
Based on a wide range of primary and secondary 
sources, including administrative files, court 
transcripts, periodicals, oral interviews, and 
material culture, the social history components 
of her study are very strong. A good use of 
quotes and chapter introductory vignettes 
contribute to an engaging read. Throughout, the 
author sketches ordinary people and their lives 
on plantations and in towns, as well as the 
geographical layouts, that really enliven the 
narrative. She also presents excellent discussions 
of topics like Chinese and Indian immigration, 
the development and social structure of towns 
and plantations, and the role of schools, 
newspapers, and voluntary associations. She 
views culturally hybrid groups (such as 
Western-educated Chinese) as among the major 
social/ bicultural brokers in the local colonial 
order.  
 
In her view, British rule constructed some 
bridges, albeit narrow and creaky ones, over 
communal differences. But while it was 
established and maintained in an authoritarian 
form on plantations, she argues, it was 
transformed and weakened in the towns. Empire 
brought with it both oppression and economic 
opportunity. The modernist middle class became 
larger over time, while many working class 
subjects experienced Malayan life as repression, 
limited options, and employment with long 
hours and short wages. But by the 1930s most 
(although certainly not all) Malayans had made 
peace with the hierarchical colonial system and 
knew how to deal with it. In her conclusion Lees 
lays out her thoughts on what this case study 
tells us about the formation, roles, and realities 
of empire. Colonialism, she argues, was in many 
ways a collaborative enterprise that benefitted 
the rulers and also the sizeable group among the 
ruled who profited from it. There is much here 
for historians and their students to discuss and 
debate. 
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Call for Panelists and Book 
Chapters 
 
Revisioning 2020 (MSB Group Project) 
 
The Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Group intends 
to sponsor a two-part panel at the AAS annual 
meeting to be held in Boston in March of 2020 
called “REVISIONING 2020” and publish an 
edited volume of the same name. Our objective is 
to rethink and revisit Mahathir's "Vision 2020" 
and the Malaysia that has emerged since he 
coined the slogan (and the uniquely Mahathir-
style “vision” of a perfect future it anticipated). It 
is our hope that the sessions will produce papers 
that can appear as chapters in an edited volume 
of the same name. 
 
Vision 2020 was set out in 1991 by Prime 
Minister Mahathir as a plan that would advance 
Malaysia to the status of a “fully developed 
country” by the year 2020. Mahathir proclaimed 
that “by the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united 
nation, with a confident Malaysian society, 
infused by strong moral and ethical values, living 
in a society that is democratic, liberal and 
tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, 
progressive and prosperous, and in full 
possession of an economy that is competitive, 
dynamic, robust, and resilient.” Vision 2020 was 
intended to provide direction to Malaysia’s 
national development project that had begun 
with NEP, extended into NDP, and position 
Malaysia as an Asian and global leader. 
Mahathir envisioned a transformation of 
Malaysia’s people and its landscape: Vision 2020 
would create a “caring” and “selfless” citizenry 
ready and responsible for the challenges of the 
nation’s future; its futuristic exhortations asked 
Malaysians to advance as citizens of a global 
cybersociety, as world-class leaders in 
technology, education, and science. 
 
But that future and Mahathir’s vision of its 
perfection was still remote in 1991, and 
Malaysians needed to change and transform 
themselves in order to reach it. Mahathir set out 
nine “central strategic challenges” that would be 
overcome in thirty years when Malaysia would 
be (1) a united nation, “Bangsa Malaysia”; (2) a 
nation “subservient to none”; (3) a mature, 
“consensual, community-oriented Malaysian 
democracy”; (4) a fully moral and ethical society 
with religious and spiritual values; (5) a liberal 
and tolerant society in which “Malaysians of all 
colours and creeds are free to practice and 
profess their customs, cultural and religious 
beliefs”; (6) a world-class scientific and 
progressive society; (7) a fully “caring society” 
and “caring culture” where the welfare of the 
people is not dependent on the “state but on the 
family”; (8) an economically just society with a 
“fair and equitable distribution of wealth in the 
nation” where “race was not identified with 
economic function”; (9) a prosperous society 
(Mahathir’s speech Wawasan 2020, Majlis 
Perdagangan Malaysia di Kuala Lumpur, 
February 28, 1991). Pointing out that it was 
likely that in the year 2020 neither he nor many 
of the Malaysians alive in 1991 would “be (t)here 
to enjoy it,” Vision 2020 strongly reflected the 
theme of “selflessness”—that Malaysians would 
always put needs of the nation before their own 
and strive towards a perfect future for the good 
of others. The fact that Mahathir is once again 
Prime Minister as 2020 approaches is just one of 
the many ironies that can be read into his 1991 
plan and his “vision.” 
 
We urge submissions from all disciplines 
(History, Political Science, Economics, Political 
Economy, Gender and Sexuality Studies, 
Development Studies, Anthropology, Sociology, 
Urban Planning, Geography, Education, etc.), 
from both “old hands” in Malaysia (people who 
have been “on the ground” in the years since 
Mahathir's announcement) and people who 
envision a Malaysia one, two, or more decades on 
from 2020 . . . in other words, everyone with a 
keen awareness of Malaysia, its problems, its 
challenges, and its politics. 
 
The list of possible topics for papers and book 
chapters is vast, and we encourage Malaysianists 
to also imagine focusing on topics that reach far 
beyond what Mahathir himself might have 
envisioned when he thought about 2020 in 
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1991—such as Malaysia and the rise of ISIS; 
Malaysia in the eyes of China; Malaysia and 
global graft; the return of Mahathir and Anwar; 
the rise and the role of shariah and its 
bureaucracy; and many others. 
 
We invite abstracts (max. 300 words) from 
scholars at any stage of their career. Please send 
your abstract along with your affiliation details 
and a short CV. We will be accepting potential 
panelists and book chapters on a rolling basis 
starting in August 2018. Feel free to contact us 
with any ideas or thoughts about this project. 
 
Patricia Sloane-White, MSB Chair 
pswhite@udel.edu 
 
Cheong Soon Gan, MSB Deputy Chair 
cgan@uwsuper.edu  
 
 
Call for Book Chapters 
 
Malaysian Politics and People: Volume 3 
 
Established in 2014, Malaysian Politics and People 
is a unique series of studies on Malaysian politics 
and society edited by Sophie Lemière. The first 
volume, Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics 
and People, was released in 2014 in the aftermath 
of GE13, and the second volume, Illusions of 
Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People Volume II 
appeared in 2017 in the lead-up to GE14. The 
series aims to make an important contribution to 
the study of Malaysian politics and society and 
to speak not only to researchers and scholars of 
Malaysia but also to activists, students, 
journalists, policy makers, and others interested 
in understanding their wider dynamics. Each 
volume brings together academics from around 
the world as well as the work of Malaysian 
cartoonist Zunar, who offers his own visual 
interpretation of each topic explored in the 
volume.  
The series has played a key role in drawing wider 
attention to Malaysian studies and placing a 
focus on emerging scholars and new areas of 
study. The first edition was a success, selling out 
its first and second prints. The second volume 
will shortly be published internationally by 
Amsterdam University Press. 
  
As Malaysia is entering a period of political 
change we are now looking ahead to the third 
volume to begin to analyze what makes up this 
“new” Malaysia. We are looking for contri-
butions offering original perspectives on 
contemporary affairs and tracing the evolution of 
political, social, and economic dynamics. We are 
particularly interested in research focusing on 
overlooked areas of Malaysian politics and 
society, emphasizing inter-disciplinarity, and 
ethnographic and fieldwork-based research.  
We would be glad to receive propositions 
exploring—but not limited to—the following 
areas: 
 
• Reform in all of its manifestations: 
institutional, governance, judicial, 
education, economic, health, agriculture 
and land, etc.  
• Malaysia and theories of democratic 
transition  
• Malaysia-China relations  
• The impact of GE14 on the wider region  
• Malaysia’s new political dynamics: 
beyond race and religion?  
• An ethnography of political parties and 
political campaigning  
• Political and social challenges in 
general, and challenges to Malay 
culture, Malay institutions Malay 
language in particular  
• Art and Politics  
• Elections: Electoral manipulation, 
historical perspectives on elections and 
campaigning  
• The place of minority groups in 
Malaysia: Women, Malaysian Indians, 
Indigenous communities and LGBTQI 
people 
• Environmental/resources issues  
 
Submission Procedure:  
Please send the following items to editor Sophie 
Lemière at sophie.lemiere@gmail.com by July 
30, 2018: 
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— an abstract of no more than 400 words 
— a short bio of no more than 300 words 
— an updated CV with current affiliation and 
publications. 
 
Final selections will be made by mid to late 
August 2018. Once accepted the final deadline 
for paper submissions will be November 30, 
2018, with publication of the volume scheduled 
for Fall 2019.  
 
Papers should be submitted exclusively in the 
following format: 
• No more than 6,000 words  
• Avoiding academic jargon yet showing 
awareness of contemporary and classic 
academic literature  
• Solidly grounded in recent empirical 
research  
• In Microsoft Word format (.doc or .docx)  
• Using British spelling and punctuation  
• In font Times New Roman size 12, without 
any formatting  
• Using Harvard Referencing Style  
 
The editor, Sophie Lemière, is a postdoctoral 
fellow at Harvard University where she received 
the 2017-18 Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs (WCFIA) Scholars 
Program fellowship. She recently obtained the 
Stanford-NUS Distinguished Lee Kong Chiang 
Fellowship for 2018-19, and a non-residential 
fellowship at the Ash Center for Democracy in 
Harvard. She will be visiting Stanford in the Fall 
2018 and NUS in the Spring 2019. In 2013, she 
started the series “Malaysian Politics and 
People” published/distributed by Gerakbudaya 
Malaysia in Southeast Asia, and University of 
Amsterdam Press and University of Chicago 
Press in Europe and North America. 
 
 
Job Opportunities 
 
NUS: Job Opportunities  
The Asia Research Institute, National 
University of Singapore, is offering various 
fixed-term positions for outstanding, active 
researchers from around the world, to work on 
an important piece of Asia-related research. 
Applicants should only apply for ONE of the 
four types of position (Senior Research Fellow, 
Research Fellow, Postdoctoral Fellow, Visiting 
Senior Research Fellow). Closing date is 
September 3, 2018. Further details: 
https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Page/ARI-
JobOpportunities2018-19  
 
 
Call for Papers  
 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs  
JCSSA is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic 
journal published by the GIGA Institute of 
Asian Studies, Hamburg. Aside from the print 
edition, JCSAA is also be available online as an 
open access journal. It presents key research and 
professional analyses on current political, 
economic, and social affairs in Southeast Asia, 
with listings in major indexes. It invites 
submissions for research articles, book reviews 
and special issue proposals. For further details 
see www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org  
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Member Notes 
 
Patricia Hardwick 
New Project: “Malay Chronicles, Thai Drama, 
Javanese Tales: Indonesian Malay Identity, 
Pasisir Cultural Flows and the Performing Arts 
in Riau Islands Province”. Senior Scholar 
Research Fulbright grant (September 2018 – 
August 2020), Hofstra University, in 
cooperation with Universitas Indonesia (UI). 
 
Her project will contextualize the role of 
contemporary cultural flows that continue to 
shape Indonesian Malay theatrical traditions and 
expressions of Indonesian Malay Identity in 
Riau Islands Province. It will also investigate the 
historical and cultural flows between the Riau 
Islands, West Java, Central Java, the Northeast 
Coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and Southern 
Thailand to explore the exchange of ideas, 
performers, and performance practices in this 
region. In an era in which ownership of 
intangible cultural heritage is often contested in 
the culturally interconnected world of maritime 
Southeast Asia, an examination of the historical 
and contemporary influence of pasisir cultural 
flows on performance forms like Riau mak 
yong will provide new perspectives on the ways 
in which people and performing arts circulated 
in the region in the period before colonial rule 
and the emergence of modern nation-states. 
 
 
Kerstin Steiner 
In late 2017, Kerstin Steiner was awarded La 
Trobe University Law School’s Research 
Excellence Award (Mid-Career), the Research 
Excellence Award (Mid-Career) of La Trobe's 
Arts, Social Sciences and Commerce (ASSC) 
College, and the Research Excellence Award 
(Mid-Career) by the university’s Deputy Vice 
Chancellor. In early 2018, she also received a 
distinguished scholar award by the Philippine 
International Studies Organization (PHISO) for 
her research in the field of international 
relations. 
 
Kerstin Steiner has also commented on the 
Malaysian 1MDB scandal with, including for 
BBC Newsday following the arrest of former 
Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak. 
The interview is available 
at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w172w
1fkx8wcjg8  
 
 
Editorial Information 
 
BERITA is the official publication of the 
Malaysian/Singapore/Brunei (MSB) Studies 
Group. A part of the Association of Asian 
Studies, we are a cross-disciplinary network of 
scholars, students, and observers with research 
and other professional interests in Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Brunei.  
 
Editor: 
Dominik M. Müller 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
muellerdo@eth.mpg.de 
 
 
